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ABSTRACT 
The Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and 
Targeting System (COASTS) program is a joint project 
between the Naval Postgraduate School and the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces (RTARF).  The program focuses its research on 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) uses for 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), state-of-the-art, rapidly 
scaleable airborne and ground communications equipment, 
including various wireless network technologies.  This 
research is being conducted in partnership with the RTARF 
to develop a network and associated devices and 
applications that potentially may help suppress drug 
trafficking in the northern Thailand border regions.   
Commensurately, the U.S. Navy is taking the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) lead in coalition Maritime Security 
Operations and riverine warfare operations. With formation 
of the new Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), and 
its new Riverine Warfare Group, the Navy’s role takes 
effect starting in January 2007, and could benefit from 
this research.    
This thesis focuses on testing and evaluating the 
overall performance of the MeshDynamics Multiple-Radio Mesh 
Modules, operating in the 802.11 wireless frequency 
spectrum.  These modules are key building blocks of meshed 
networks that provide coverage over an area where riverine 
and coastal operations are being conducted.  The network 
provides an information source and communications backbone 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN DAY FORCES 
The constant advancement of technology in today’s 
world has transformed the military forces in the United 
States, as well as in many other nations around the world.  
Advancements in information technology, in particular, have 
generated interest in a more futuristic style of combat 
known as “Network Centric Warfare” (Alberts et al., 1999).  
NCW has been defined as “an information-superiority enabled 
concept of operations that generates increased combat power 
by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to 
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.” 
(Alberts et al. 1999) 
In May 2000, the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff 
released “Joint Vision 2020” (JV2020).  This document 
emphasized the goal of having a joint force capable of 
full-spectrum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in 
war, and preeminent in any form of conflict (Dept. of 
Defense 2000, 1).  The concepts of dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full 
dimensional protection are the foundation of JV2020.  
Furthermore, JV2020 “focuses on three factors as central to 
success in these four operational concepts and the 
resulting capability of full-spectrum dominance:  
Interoperability, Innovation, and Decision Superiority 
(Dept. of Defense 2000, 1).” 
 2 
Information superiority is central to our constantly 
evolving forces.  The speed at which US military forces 
gather and disseminate information directly affects mission 
success across the full spectrum of operations.  Since the 
start of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM, U.S. and Coalition forces have applied modern-day 
technologies to support the concept of Network Centric 
Warfare espoused by JV2020.  Quite successfully, NCW 
capabilities have also been employed to support 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations globally. 
B. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, much has been 
done to revamp the United States’ National Defense 
Strategy.  In particular, protecting the maritime domain 
has received much emphasis.  The “maritime domain” is 
defined as all areas relating to, adjacent to, or bordering 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, 
and vessels and other conveyances (Dept. of Homeland 
Security 2005, 1).  On December 21, 2004, National Security 
Presidential Directive #41 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive #13 was released with Maritime 
Security Policy as its subject matter.  This directive 
established U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation 
actions to enhance U.S. national security and homeland 
security by protecting U.S. maritime interests.  Maritime 
security is an issue that concerns not only the U.S. but 
the entire globe.  According to the directive, “the United 
States, in cooperation with our allies and friends around 
the world and our State, local, and private sector 
partners, will work to ensure that lawful private and 
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public activities in the Maritime Domain are protected 
against attack and criminal and otherwise unlawful hostile 
exploitation.  These efforts are critical to global 
economic stability, security and growth (NSPD-41/HSPD-13 
2004, 2).” Unprecedented advances in information technology 
and telecommunications have increased the range and 
effectiveness of terrorist and criminal acts, as well as 
our ability to prevent and to defend against them. 
According to this Maritime Security Policy, some other 
important measures that the U.S. must undertake are 
• Expediting recovery and response from attacks 
within the Maritime Domain 
• Maximizing awareness of security issues in the 
Maritime Domain in order to support U.S. forces 
and to improve response to identified threats 
• Enhancing international relationships and 
promoting the integration of international 
partners in order to improve the global maritime 
security framework 
• Ensuring the implementation of responsibilities 
that maintain a secure Maritime Domain (NSPD-
41/HSPD-13 2004, 3). 
C. RIVERINE WARFARE 
Dating back to the American Revolution, the U.S. 
Navy’s history of riverine warfare operations is quite 
substantial.  However, the last major campaign involving 
Navy riverine forces was the Vietnam War.  This campaign is 
also very significant because there are several lessons 
learned that can be applied to the development of today’s 
riverine forces.  The asymmetric war-fighting tactics of 
the enemy forces along with the riverine and jungle 
environments in the Vietnam War have several similarities 
to the enemies that U.S. forces are encountering in  
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today’s Global War on Terror (GWOT).  In order to combat 
the terrorists in this ongoing war, the U.S. Navy is taking 
steps to resurrect its riverine warfare roots.  With the 
formation of a new command called the Naval Expeditionary 
Combat Command, containing within it a new Riverine Warfare 
Group, the Navy hopes to begin playing a role in Maritime 
Security Operations and riverine warfare operations in the 
GWOT starting in 2007.    
D. COASTS 
1.  Situation 
Currently most of the drug smuggling activity 
occurring in Thailand is concentrated in the northern 
border areas, while most of the civil unrest is occurring 
in the south.  Both of these regions of the border are 
quite rugged and require many resources to manage, making 
these locations ideal for drug and terrorist or insurgent 
operations.  The development of a robust and rapidly 
deployable network that is equipped with increased 
bandwidth and modern surveillance technologies can greatly 
aid the Thai military and law enforcement agencies to 
accomplish their counterinsurgency and counter-drug 
missions. 
The importance of a coalition-oriented focus for 
modern Maritime Domain Awareness and Protection operations 
has become a major priority of U.S. combatant commanders. 
In a recent naval message, all numbered fleet commanders 
stated that their number one Command, Control, Computers, 
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) requirement was improved coalition 
communications (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 7). Current and future 
operational capabilities are tightly tied to improved 
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interoperability with U.S. allies in the operational 
theater. As reflected by the increasing number of requests 
to the Naval Postgraduate School from foreign partners, 
there is an immediate requirement for low-cost, state-of-
the-art, real-time threat warning and tactical 
communication equipment that is also rapidly scaleable 
based on operational and tactical considerations (COASTS 
CONOPS 2006, 7). This issue has become especially apparent 
in the face of the overwhelming mission requirements placed 
on US forces conducting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
The GWOT extends globally where nations are engaged in 
direct action against numerous forces employing asymmetric 
tactics. In Thailand, the separatist insurgency in the 
southern provinces is connected to various transnational 
terrorist organizations, to include both the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda, which have struck against both 
the U.S. and its allies (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 3). 
2.   Background 
In its second year of existence, the Coalition 
Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting System (COASTS) 
is modeled after a highly successful ongoing NPS-driven 
field experimentation program entitled the “NPS-U.S. 
Special Operations Command Field Experimentation Program” 
(NPSSOCFEP).  NPSSOCFEP is executed by NPS, in cooperation 
with U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and several 
contractors and has been active since FY2002.  The 
program’s inception supported USSOCOM requirements by 
integrating emerging wireless local area network (WLAN) 
technologies with surveillance and targeting 
hardware/software systems to augment Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) missions. (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 1) 
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The COASTS field experimentation program supports the 
science and technology research requirements relating to 
theater and national security, counter-drug and law 
enforcement missions, and the GWOT for the following 
organizations: 
• U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
• Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W) 
• Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand 
(JUSMAGTHAI) 
• U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
• Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
• Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) 
• Thai Department of Research & Development Office 
(DRDO) (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 2) 
The COASTS program is a joint project between NPS and 
the Royal Thai Armed Forces.  The program focuses research 
on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), state-of-the-art, 
rapidly scaleable airborne and ground communications 
equipment, including various wireless network technologies.  
This research is being conducted in partnership with the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces to develop a network and associated 
devices and applications that potentially may help suppress 
the drug trafficking in northern Thailand. 
3. COASTS 2005 RECAP 
In May 2005, the COASTS team conducted field 
experiments in the Royal Thai Air Force Wing 2 (Lop Buri) 
training area.  The team successfully integrated Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), aerial balloons, portable and fixed 
ground-based sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
non-GPS enabled tracking systems, as well as other 
technologies to provide shared situational awareness to 
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local and strategic users.  The main focus of this 
deployment was to integrate all of the sensor data at a 
Royal Thai Army command and control vehicle, called a 
Mobile Command Platform (MCP), and then to link it to the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces headquarters located in Bangkok, 
Thailand.  However, due to real-world operational 
commitments, the MCP asset was never fully integrated in 
the field experiments (COASTS After Action Report 2005, 
Enclosure 2). 
Also, the wireless communication network deployed to 
assist with tactical communications was never fully 
realized. The IEEE 802.11b standard was used as the 
backbone of this network and employed Rajant Technologies 
hardware; specifically their meshed wireless access points 
known as BreadCrumbs®.  The BreadCrumbs® that were deployed 
included the XL, SE, and ME models (Figure 1).  These 
devices were compliant with 802.11b and varied in size, 
power, and range.  The Rajant Breadcrumbs® proved to be an 
unreliable solution for the hostile environment in which 
they were used, as weather and distance severely diminished 
their performance.  The inability to cool these devices 
caused them to overheat on a regular basis.  As a result, 
the intended placement of wireless access points in the 
overall network topology had to be adjusted considerably. 
The following recommendations were taken from the COASTS 
2005 After Action Report: 
• Change the color of the boxes (black is not the 
optimum choice) as this color absorbs heat and 
makes the BreadCrumbs® susceptible to failure 
under conditions of high temperature and 




of internal fan or environmental control when 
used in environments such as those experienced in 
Thailand. 
• The situational awareness software that is used 
to manage the Breadcrumbs®, known as “BCAdmin”, 
uses about 2 Mbps of network traffic per 
operating client. The number of clients running 
should be limited to provide more bandwidth. 
• The 802.11b operating space is limited and future 
product iterations should consider upgrading to 
the IEEE standard of 802.11g or 802.11n for 
better range and throughput.  
• To better deploy the Rajant Breadcrumbs® to 
tactical hostile environments, employing an 
overlapping, redundant mesh is essential. Single 
Breadcrumbs® would work less reliably than two 
co-located Breadcrumbs.  
• If Breadcrumbs are to be used as wireless access 
points for aerial balloon payloads, two separate 
Breadcrumbs® should be used in a given footprint.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Different Models of Rajant BreadCrumbs® 
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Another challenge that the network faced was a lack of 
redundancy.  In the environmentally severe conditions found 
at Lop Buri, problems can occur with any and all electronic 
devices, and it is important to ensure that as few points 
of failure exist as possible.  Due to fiscal constraints, 
the team did not deploy with enough Breadcrumbs® to 
construct an overlapping, redundant mesh.  Figure 2 shows 
the overall topology developed by the COASTS 2005 team.  
 
 
Figure 2.   COASTS 2005 Network Topology 
 
4. COASTS 2006  
COASTS 2006 expanded upon the original field 
experiment conducted during last year’s deployment to Wing 
2, Lop Buri, Thailand.  This year’s network topology 
advanced research relative to low-cost, commercially 
available solutions while integrating each 
technology/capability into a larger system of systems in 
support of tactical action scenarios (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 
3).  The demonstration that took place in March 2006 was an 
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air-, ground-, and water-based scenario, occurring just 
north of Chiang Mai, Thailand at the Mae Ngat Dam.  Figure 
3 is a map of Thailand and some of its bordering countries. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Map of Thailand (From: 
www.greenwaythailand.org/fotos/map-thailand.jpg 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
The scenario encompassed first-responder, law 
enforcement, counter-terrorism, and counter-drug 
objectives.  The tactical information that was collected 
from the scenario was fused, displayed, and distributed in 
real-time to local (Chiang Mai), theater (Bangkok), and 
global (Alameda and Monterey, CA) Command and Control (C2) 
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centers.  COASTS 2006 will examine the feasibility of 
rapidly deploying networks and explore sustainment 
considerations with respect to a hostile climactic 
environment (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 3). 
This year’s team spent much time performing field 
testing in the months prior to deploying to Thailand.  
Testing sessions took place at the following locations and 
times: 
• Pt. Sur, CA in December 2005  
• Fort Ord, CA in January 2006 
• Fort Hunter Liggett, CA in January/February 2006 
• Mae Ngat Dam (Thailand) in March 2006 
• Mae Ngat Dam (Thailand) in May 2006.    
Continuing with last year’s research theme, the COASTS 
2006 team examined the feasibility of rapidly-deploying 
networks, called “Fly-away Kits” (FLAK) and explored 
sustainment considerations with respect to a hostile 
climatic (temperature, humidity, wind, etc.) environment. 
Network improvements included the testing and evaluating of 
new 802.11g mesh WLAN equipment, the refinement of a 
jointly-developed (NPS and Mercury Data Systems) 3-D 
topographic shared situational awareness (SSA) application 
called C3Trak, and integration of “satellite in a suitcase” 
(portable satellite communication equipment) technology.   
Some other improvements included the enhancement of 
unattended ground and water-based sensors, new balloon and 
UAV designs, portable biometric devices, portable explosive 
residue detecting devices, and revised operational 
procedures for deploying of the network (COASTS CONOPS 
2006, 3-4). 
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E.  THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis primarily researches the effectiveness of 
the MeshDynamics Multiple-Radio Mesh Modules in augmenting 
the Command, Control, Communications, and Computers for 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
capability in support of coalition maritime and coastal 
security operations. 
Secondary research addresses network performance to 
include an examination of the following issues and 
questions: 
• What is the effectiveness of the MeshDynamics 
Multiple-Radio Mesh Modules in providing an 
effective wireless meshed network and backbone in 
support of tactical coalition operations in a 
maritime and coastal environment, specifically?  
• What effects do balloon payload altitudes have on 
network connectivity? 
• What effects do the environmental conditions and 
regional landscape conditions have on network 
performance? 
• What is the optimal antenna configuration for the 
network based on a variety of deployment 
topologies?   
• What is the most effective radio-antenna 
combination (50 mW radio + 8 dbi antenna, 400 mW 
radio + 12 dbi antenna, etc.) in terms of network 
performance? 
• How well does the network support live video 
feeds from multiple nodes?  
The tertiary questions dealing with network topology 
that this thesis explores are 
• What is the optimal altitude for the balloon 
nodes? 
• What is the optimal distance between the nodes?  
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• What is the optimal number of nodes that should 
be employed to set up the wireless mesh? 
• How many ground nodes must be employed as part of 
the meshed network? 
• What is the optimal network topology to support 
reliable (redundant) communications for critical 
networks? 
• What is the optimal antenna configuration to 
support reliable (redundant) communications for 
critical networks? 
Additionally, the context for use of this type of 
technology is raised as a potential force multiplier for 
the new U.S. Riverine forces, which are scheduled to deploy 
in Iraq by January 2007.  The U.S. Navy will then take over 
responsibility from the U.S. Marine Corps in defense of the 
vital Haditha Dam complex, located on the Euphrates River 
in western Iraq.  Establishing situational awareness by 
employing a proven Coalition Operating Area Surveillance 
and Targeting System (COASTS) could help ensure more 
effective mission accomplishment. 
In the end, the research conducted as part of this 
thesis will pave the way for successful operational and 
tactical deployment of wireless C2 networks in support of 
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II. U.S. NAVY RIVERINE WARFARE EVOLUTION AND 
DOCTRINE 
The doctrine for US Riverine Warfare is still 
evolving.  Although riverine warfare is not a new concept 
for the US Navy, it has been set aside somewhat since the 
Vietnam War era.  In May 2005, a Global War On Terror 
(GWOT) Working Group was formed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) to support the Quadrennial Defense Review.  
The group identified several gaps in the US Navy’s riverine 
capabilities, expeditionary support, and the Navy’s ability 
to engage countries in matters pertaining to internal 
defense and security assistance (Benbow et al., 1).  This 
chapter examines what the US has attempted and accomplished 
in filling these gaps and how history has played a role in 
the process.  
A.  HISTORY OF U.S. NAVY RIVERINE WARFARE 
Although the Navy has a long record of riverine 
operations, its record has been more episodic than 
continuous.  The Navy has conducted numerous riverine 
campaigns dating back to the American Revolution; however, 
the end of each of these campaigns often resulted in the 
disbanding of the riverine units and the removal of 
riverine capabilities from the Navy’s inventory (Benbow et 
al. 2006, 13).   
Based on the riverine campaigns which the US Navy has 
conducted, there is no one mission set or force construct 
that has characterized them (Benbow et al. 2006, 11).  The 
Navy’s record of riverine operations encompasses a wide 
variety of missions and tasks to include: 
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• River assault 
• Lines of communication protection 
• Security operations 
• River crossings 
• Operations other than war 
• Theater security cooperation 
• Homeland security 
• Counter-drug operations (Benbow et al. 2006, 11). 
Many of these missions have also varied in scale and 
physical environment.   
The following is a list of some of the major campaigns 
in which the US Navy has made use of its riverine 
warfighting capabilities: 
• American Revolution 
• Civil War 
• Yangtze River Operations (China) 
• Vietnam War. 
One of the key tenets taken from the Civil War was the 
importance of jointness among forces.  According to Dr. 
Craig L. Symonds, former US Naval Academy professor and 
distinguished author,  
The ability of an army-navy team to work together 
depended on the on-scene officers’ ”willingness 
to cooperate.”  The battles for Fort Henry, Fort 
Donelson, and Island No. 10 were significant 
attempts at this nascent military jointness.  It 
was jointness, ultimately, that won the river 
war, “and that is still the key today (Mills 
2006, 3). 
On top of being the last major campaign in which USN 
riverine forces were used, Vietnam is also regarded as a 
reference for the development of today’s modern riverine 
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doctrine.  However, according to Dr. Edward J. Marolda, 
senior historian at the Naval Historical Center:  
Riverine warfare did not come naturally to the 
Navy after World War II,’ which had imbued 
America’s sea strategists with the concept of 
big, blue-water battles.  It was JFK’s advocacy 
that was crucial in steering the Navy in a 
riverine direction in the early 1960s, despite 
initial pushback by those in the Navy who saw 
river ops as outside the primary-mission sphere 
(Mills 2006, 5).        
The five major mission areas in which US riverine 
forces acted on in the Vietnam War were 
• River Assault 
• River Patrol and Control 
• River Minesweeping 
• Special Operations Support 
• Fire Support from Riverine Forces. 
Along with the lessons learned from the above 
missions, another major lesson was the importance of 
jointness (again, as in the Civil War) and 
interoperability.  With over 22,500 personnel deployed in 
support of the riverine forces in Vietnam, the two key 
players in this role were aviation operations and logistics 
support (Benbow et al. 2006, 17).  Aviation units supported 
the riverine forces with surveillance, fires, insertion, 
extraction, medical evacuation, and other tasks.  The two 
main aviation support units during the Vietnam War were the 
HAL-3 Seawolves attack helicopter squadron and the VAL-4 
Black Ponies attack airplane squadron.  In a discussion 
with Professor Mitch Brown, a retired Navy Commander and 
former Seawolf, he stressed the importance of air, water, 
and land units all supporting each other in riverine 
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operations.  Professor Brown recalled several instances in 
which he was sent in to insert and extract Navy SEAL units 
from hot spots in Vietnam. He also cited how reciprocally, 
SEALs agreed to be sent in to extract pilots from a crash 
site.   
Logistics support entailed bases that were both ashore 
and afloat.  Support ships provided functions such as  
• Command and control 
• Berthing and Messing  
• Medical Support 
• Supply Support 
• Maintenance and Repair Support 
• Naval Gunfire Support (Benbow et al. 2006, 17). 
The importance of the roles played by these support 
teams indicated that riverine forces could not operate 
alone.  The riverine environment is one in which ground and 
naval units, as well as air combat units, routinely operate 
(Benbow et al. 2006, 20).  This interoperability is most 
important because of the versatility that riverine forces 
must have.  According to Captain Joseph Hock, commander of 
River Squadron 51 in Vietnam from 1969 to 1970, “Riverine 
warfare is not control of just the rivers and canals, it is 
control of the whole area, and that takes more than just 
boats.  You have to become part of the culture.  You have 
to integrate (Mills 2006, 5).”  
Now with the GWOT, the lessons learned from past 
riverine operations are being used to form a modern 
doctrine that supports today’s missions.  However, the 
concepts of jointness and interoperability still remain the 
tenets of modern riverine doctrine. 
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B. MODERN RIVERINE DOCTRINE 
The need to establish a new and improved riverine 
force has become a high priority item for US military 
leadership.  The only resource the Navy has to start with 
is its base of doctrine and lessons learned from its long 
history of similar campaigns.  However, platforms in the US 
Navy’s inventory, such as helicopters and patrol craft 
(PC), will be crucial in the support missions required to 
initiate riverine operations.  Currently, the US Marine 
Corps and Army have the lead role in worldwide riverine 
operations, so it is important for the Navy to cooperate in 
a joint environment until it can support most of the 
elements of a riverine force on its own.  Figure 4 shows 
all of the different areas that overlap in operations for 
maritime security and riverine operations.  This figure 
emphasizes the fact that riverine operations are inherently 
joint.  Land, maritime, and air assets are all key elements 
that must be working together along with logistics support.    
 
 
Figure 4.   Areas of Operations in Maritime Security and 




On July 6, 2005, former CNO, Admiral Vernon Clark 
called for an expansion of the Navy’s capabilities in order 
to be victorious in the GWOT.  One of the actions he called 
for was the establishment of a riverine force (Benbow et 
al. 2006, 5).  This idea was emphasized again by Admiral 
Mullen, the current CNO.  Admiral Mullen stated, 
We need a fleet that can operate at the other end 
of the spectrum.  We need a green-water 
capability and a brown-water capability. I want a 
balanced force in every sense of the word. I 
believe our Navy is missing a great opportunity 
to influence events by not having a riverine 
force.  We’re going to have one (Benbow et al., 
2006, 5). 
Since the end of the Cold War, not much attention has 
been placed on developing the riverine capabilities of our 
Navy.  When people think of the US Navy, they think blue-
water Navy, a force with large ships, including aircraft 
carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and nuclear submarines.  
However, the threat that our nation currently faces is one 
that is characterized by terrorists and insurgents 
operating in riverine and coastal environments in third-
world countries.  Also important to understand is that in 
many of these countries, the waterways are central to their 
societies.  Rivers function as means of transportation, as 
well as communication and commerce.   
Since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the 
majority of riverine operations in Iraq have been conducted 
by the US Marine Corps, US Army, and US Special Operations 




of relieving itself from this role.  With the Marine Corps 
stepping down, the proper time for the Navy to assume this 
role is now. 
C.  NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT COMMAND (NECC) 
The Navy has begun taking steps to develop our 
nation’s riverine forces.  Essentially starting from 
scratch as a new command, the Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC), as part of the Navy’s U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command, was formed in October 2005 with Rear Admiral 
Donald K. Bullard as its commander.  Within the overall 
NECC, the Navy’s Riverine Force will primarily focus on 
conducting Maritime Security Operations in the GWOT, a 
mission that has thus far been performed by the US Marine 
Corps.  The main missions of this new Navy riverine force 
will include: 
• Riverine area control/denial 
• Interdiction of riverine lines of communication 
• Insertion / extraction of conventional ground 
forces 
• Fire support 
• Theater security cooperation (Riverine Force 
CONOPS 2006). 
Under this command, the intent is to establish a 
Riverine Group with three active component Riverine 
Squadrons and three Reserve Component augmentation units 
(Riverine Force CONOP, March 2006).  Along with the 
riverine combat element, the 40,000-strong NECC will be 
composed of other combat elements to include:  
• Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) – formerly part of 
Maritime Force Protection Command (MARFPCOM) 
• Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) – formerly 
part of MARFPCOM 
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• Mobile Diving and Salvage  
• Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support 
• Naval Construction 
• Naval Security 
• Other specialized naval forces (Benbow et al. 
2006, 7). 
Figure 5 below breaks down the NECC into its 
individual combat and support elements. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Organizational Breakdown of the NECC (From: 
Benbow et al., 2006, 8) 
 
As depicted above, the Riverine component of the NECC, 
called Riverine Warfare Group One (NRG-1), is to be 
composed of three squadrons with the first squadron to 
become operational in January 2007.  The remaining two 
squadrons will activate in 2008 and 2009.   
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The riverine squadrons will comprise sixteen riverine 
craft in four separate groups, each composed of four 
riverine craft (three active and one reserve).  Each craft 
will have two separate five-man crews to enable port and 
starboard rotation during surge operations (Benbow et al. 
2006, 8).  Presently, the first squadron will be mission-
focused on Maritime Security Operations in support of 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) starting in January 2007.  
When these riverine squadrons become operational, one must 
remember that riverine operations require both aviation and 
logistics support in order to be effective.  The squadrons 
will rely on aviation units for tasking that may include: 
• Air interdiction 
• Close air support (CAS) – integrated, attached, 
assigned, or on call 
• Surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic 
support  
• Inter and intra-theater lift including both 
tactical and logistical (Riverine Force CONOPS 
2006). 
Not much has been documented in regards to the 
aviation units that will be supporting these newly formed 
riverine squadrons, but it must be a high-priority item to 
allow riverine units to successfully perform their 
missions.  Dedicated air assets need to be identified and 
configured with appropriate C4ISR systems that are 
interoperable with ground-based systems.    
Another crucial factor to consider in the formation of 
the Navy’s new riverine force is the development of a 
command structure that allows for the integration of each 
element with command, control, communications, computers, 
and intelligence (C4I) resources.  Development of the NECC 
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and its respective riverine combat units is where the 
COASTS 2006 team becomes significant. 
D.  APPLICATION OF COASTS 2006 TO U.S. NAVY RIVERINE 
FORCES  
In order to fuse the research done by the COASTS 2006 
team and the development of the U.S. Navy’s new riverine 
forces, recapping the missions of both organizations is 
important.  COASTS 2006 has conducted research of 
relatively low-cost, commercially available solutions while 
integrating each technology/capability into a larger system 
of systems in support of tactical action scenarios.  This 
year’s COASTS scenario took place at the Mae Ngat Dam, 
located just north of Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The air-, 
ground-, and water-based scenario encompassed first-
responder, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and counter-
drug objectives (COASTS CONOPS 2006, 3).  The network that 
the COASTS team developed served as the central C4ISR asset 
that integrated all of the air-, ground-, and water-based 
units, allowing them to share information with one another 
in a real-time environment.   
The Navy’s Riverine Force will serve the primary 
purpose of conducting Maritime Security Operations in the 
GWOT.  This multifaceted mission will require coordination 
with joint forces, as well as coalition partners.  The 
presence of a common operating environment that seamlessly 
integrates all of the units involved in any type of 
maritime security or riverine operation is essential to 
ensure that all of the combat and support elements can take 
advantage of one another’s strengths.   
The solution that COASTS 2006 provided was used 
specifically in conjunction with the Royal Thai Armed 
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Forces to provide full situational awareness to units 
performing counter-drug operations in a riverine 
environment.  However, the C4ISR architecture developed by 
COASTS 2006 is not limited to use with this specific type 
of operation.  With the GWOT extending globally where 
nations, especially the U.S., are engaged in direct actions 
against numerous forces operating in environments other 
than the open ocean, this type of C4ISR architecture 
established by the COASTS 2006 team will have great 
utility.  Three of the basic elements of the COASTS 2006 
architecture were  
• C4ISR suite 
• A threat warning system 
• Intelligence collection system (COASTS CONOPS 
2006, 17) 
All three of these elements were part of a system of 
systems that could be used to support a wide variety of 
maritime security and riverine warfare operations.   
With January 2007 approaching quickly, the NECC must 
ensure that solid C4I architecture is implemented before 
activating any of the riverine squadrons.  Depending on the 
development that has been achieved to this point, the C4I 
architecture and common operating environment suite that 
the COASTS 2006 team developed may serve as an excellent 
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III. TECHNOLOGY DISCUSSION 
A.  OUTLINE 
This chapter specifically surveys the architecture 
considerations and technologies used in the development of 
the COASTS 2006 network.  The first section discusses the 
concept of wireless meshed networks and their associated 
advantages and disadvantages.  The following sections 
contain information about specific pieces of equipment and 
software that are used within the COASTS network topology.  
Section C details the design and the use of the 
MeshDynamics 802.11 Multiple-Radio Mesh Modules that serve 
as the key building blocks of the COASTS network.  Section 
D focuses on the different antennas and radios that are 
used in conjunction with the MeshDynamics Modules.  
Throughout the months of testing, various antenna and radio 
configurations were tested to determine which possible 
combinations would provide the most reliable wireless 
meshed network.  Sections E and F discuss two different 
types of software that were used to analyze the performance 
of the MeshDynamics modules during both the individual 
testing and network setup.   
B.  WIRELESS MESHED NETWORKS (WMN) 
Advances in wireless technology still require more 
research and development, and subsequent testing and 
evaluation, before reaching their full operational 
potential.  One of the key Internet access technologies 
that is drawing significant attention these days is 
wireless meshed networks (WMN).  WMNs are an inexpensive 
way to provide last-mile broadband Internet access (Jun and 
Sichitiu 2002).  
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Wireless meshed networks have several advantages over 
the other broadband technologies, including cable, DSL, and 
satellite Internet access.  The initial upfront costs for 
setting up a WMN are low.  Because these networks can be 
easily up-scaled, the initial setup only requires a few 
nodes to be installed.  After that, the technology allows 
for the installment of additional nodes as required.  As 
the number of nodes within the WMN increases, the 
reliability and overall geographic coverage of the network 
also increases.  Another advantage of the WMN is that they 
are dynamically self-organizing and self-configuring, with 
the nodes in the network automatically establishing and 
maintaining routes among themselves (Jun and Sichitiu 
2002).  These nodes, or network clients, also have the 
option to be stationary or mobile, creating a more flexible 
network.   
In the WMN, each node acts not only as a host, but 
also as a wireless router (Alicherry et al., 2005).  This 
dual role of node and router serves as the key element of a 
wireless meshed network.  As with any meshed network, 
whether wired or wireless, there is one master element, or 
node, that serves as the gateway between the Internet and 
the entire meshed network.  Subsequently, each additional 
node that is added to the network becomes part of the 
network’s infrastructure by routing information over single 
or multiple hops throughout the mesh (Jun and Sichitiu 
2002).  This capability allows wireless clients to 
associate with the network without having to be associated 
with the master element.  When discussing the COASTS 2006 
network topology, the term “root node” is often used in 
place of the term “master element”. 
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In the design of a WMN, trade-offs are made between 
overall efficiency and the need for redundancy and 
protection.  The network’s ability to be easily up-scaled 
increases the number of different paths that exist between 
the nodes.  If there are N nodes in a meshed network, then 
the number of links in the network would be 2N (DeMartino 
2003).  Thus, as the size of the mesh increases, the 
redundancy and protection in the network increases.  In the 
instance of a large WMN, the self-healing characteristic is 
beneficial.  If one of the nodes in the network fails, the 
information being passed has multiple paths to travel over.  
As a result, the failure of the individual node does not 
necessarily cause network failure.  However, the failure of 
one node may still result in a decrease in efficiency.  In 
a meshed network, the nodes are self-organizing and 
designed to send information across the fastest path.  If a 
node fails, this may result in the information being passed 
across a path that may be less efficient (DeMartino 2003). 
Despite being self-healing, wireless meshed networks 
using 802.11 technologies face the risk of being jammed.  
Since 802.11 technologies operate on either the 2.4GHz or 
5.8 GHz range, it is possible for a hostile force to 
radiate energy in either one of the frequency ranges in 
order to jam the network.    
Another discussion point regarding the IEEE 802.11 and 
wireless meshed networks is the use of multiple channels 
and radios.  Today most multi-hop networks use only a 
single channel to communicate among their nodes.  The 
capacity of a single channel is often reduced due to the 
interference that is caused by multiple simultaneous 
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transmissions (Raniwala and Chiueh 2005).  This does not 
allow the network to fully exploit the bandwidth that is 
available in the radio spectrum.  Although the IEEE 
802.11b/g and 802.11a standards provide three and twelve 
non-overlapped frequency channels respectively, that could 
be used simultaneously, most networks still do not 
capitalize on this capability (Raniwala and Chiueh 2005).  
Providing a meshed network’s wireless nodes/routers with 
multiple-radios allows the nodes to transmit and receive 
simultaneously, or transmit on multiple channels 
simultaneously.  This increases the effective bandwidth 
that can be used by the wireless network nodes (Raniwala 
and Chiueh 2005).  The MeshDynamics 802.11 Multiple-Radio 
Mesh Modules that are being used as the wireless nodes for 
the COASTS 2006 network take advantage of this multiple-
radio/multiple-channel concept.  The next section further 
details the design of the multiple-radio nodes.      
Overall, the characteristic that separates wireless 
meshed networks from other broadband technologies is that 
they are self-organizing and self-healing networks that can 
be deployed easily and incrementally, making them cost-
efficient and flexible (Naghian 2004).   
C.  MESHDYNAMICS 802.11 MULTIPLE-RADIO MESH MODULES 
Guided by recommendations from the COASTS 2005 After 
Action Report, this year’s team acquired new devices to 
serve as the wireless access points for the network 
topology.  The new access points are the MeshDynamics 
802.11 Multiple-Radio Mesh Modules (Figure 6) and are part 
of the MeshDynamics MD4000 Modular Mesh family of products.  
These devices were chosen because of the many improved  
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capabilities they had over other commercial competitor 





Figure 6.   MeshDynamics 802.11 Multiple-Radio Mesh 
Modules (From:  
www.meshdynamics.com\MDProductNRadio.html 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
Table 1 below is a list of some of the key specifications 
of the MeshDynamics 802.11 Modular Mesh devices taken 













Dimensions and Weight 
 Operating Temp. Range 
Weather Rating 
 Power Supply Voltage 
  Power Consumption 
  Operating System 
 Ethernet Ports Serial Ports 
8" (length)  6" (width) 2" (height), 3.0 lbs 
- 40 to  + 85 Celsius.  
NEMA 67 weather tight 
18-27 DC supplied by Power over Ethernet. 
5-12 W, depending on number of radios 
Embedded Linux 2.4.24        
Two on bottom. One with Power over Ethernet 
(PoE)  
One, can be exposed through second Ethernet Port.
Number of Radios per Box 
Maximum Radio Supported. 
Frequency Bands Supported. 
Up to 4 mini-PCI Atheros a/b/g radio cards per 
box 
An additional 4 more radios on slave module for a 
total of 8.  




Latency between Hops 
22 Mbps TCP/IP,  44 Mbps TCP/IP in Turbo mode.  
No degradation per hop. Less than 1 ms per hop. 
Less than 1 ms per hop. 
 
Adjustable ACK timing? 




Yes. Range: 50 us - 500 us, for each radio 
Yes. Manual overrides/channel exclusions also 
possible 
Yes. Country and channel selection user-settable 
from NMS. 
Security/Encryption ?  
Secure Backhaul Traffic ? 
Priority Traffic (QoS) ? 
Multiple VLANs Supported ? 
Multiple SSIDs  Supported ? 
Hidden SSID Possible ? 
Bandwidth Control ?  
Module is FCC Compliant? 
Module is Field Upgradeable ? 
Yes. Support WEP and WPA/AES (with temporal   
keys).  
Yes. 128 Bit WPA/AES encryption (with temporal 
keys). 
Yes. Up to 4 IEEE 802.11e compliant categories 
supported. 
Yes.  16 standard. 
Yes.  16 standard 
Yes. SSID beaconing may be muted through the NMS 





Table 1.   MeshDynamics 802.11 Mutliple-Radio Mesh Module 
Specifications (From: 
http://www.meshdynamics.com/MDProductNRadio.html 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
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Some of the most important characteristics that make 
these devices more reliable than other commercial products 
are their advertised thermal characteristics and improved 
bandwidth usage.  Last year’s devices constantly 
overheated, resulting in significant drops in network 
performance and sometimes even a complete shutdown of the 
network.  However, the MeshDynamics Modules are advertised 
as being able to operate in an environment with a 
temperature range of between -40 and +85 degrees Celsius.   
The basic mesh module (Figure 7) is capable of 
supporting up to 4 Atheros-based a/b/g radios configured to 
operate in either the 5.8GHz or 2.4GHz spectrum.   
  
                      
Figure 7.   Port Numbers on Mesh Modules (From: 
http://www.meshdynamics.com/MDProductNRadio.html 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
In the multiple-radio modules, port 0 and port 1 are 
designed to house the two backhaul radios.  These radios 
operate in the 5.8GHz radio spectrum.  Port 0 houses the 
uplink radio and port 1 houses the downlink radio.  Port 2 
is designed to house the service radio, which provides 
service to wireless clients seeking to associate with the 
network.  If four radios are being used, port 3 provides 
the option to install a scanning radio or a second service 
radio.  The service and scanning radios installed in ports 
2 and 3 operate in the 2.4GHz radio spectrum.  The majority 
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of testing done by this year’s team involved the use of 
three radio units.  An example is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Inside View of a 3-radio MeshDynamics Mesh 
Module 
 
One of the advantages of these basic mesh modules is 
that they can be configured to fit the needs of a specific 
network.  The 2-radio units can be used for a basic 
wireless meshed backhaul network.  These units can then be 
upgraded (in the field) to 3-radio and 4-radio units if the 
number of clients using the network increases.  During the 
COASTS 2006 field experiments the team was unable to test 
for the maximum amount of clients that could associate with 
each of the Mesh Modules.  However, according to 
MeshDynamics research, a multi-radio device does not suffer 
from bandwidth degradation as much as a single radio device 
does 
(http://www.meshdynamics.com/MDPerformanceAnalysis.html).  
The Mesh Modules can also be configured with different 
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power radio transmitters, operating frequencies, and 
software configurations in order to meet the requirements 
of the network.   
The MeshDynamics 802.11 Multiple-Radio Mesh Modules 
make it possible to fully exploit the available bandwidth.  
Having only one radio does not allow each mesh node to send 
and to receive simultaneously.  However, a two- or three-
radio unit allows for operation within non interfering 
channels. 
The MeshDynamics 802.11 Mesh Modules are part of a 
large family of MeshDynamics Structured Mesh devices.  The 
following two tables layout the specifications of the two 
different MeshDynamics 802.11 Mesh Modules that were used 
for the COASTS 2006 iteration.  Table 2 gives a breakdown 
of the radio configurations in each of the two MeshDynamics 
Mesh Module models used by the COASTS 2006 team. Table 3 
provides a more detailed breakdown of what each model 
number shown in Table 2 represents. These tables were 
constructed by USAF 1st Lieutenant Robert Lounsbury, an NPS 
student in the Joint Command, Control, Computers, 
Communications and Intelligence (JC4I) curriculum, as part 













Four slot mini-PCI motherboard  
Two 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 5, IEEE 802.11a, 
5.8GHz backhaul radios 
One 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 2, IEEE 802.11b/g 




Four slot mini-PCI motherboard  
Two 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 2, IEEE 
802.11b/g, 2.4GHz backhaul/service radios 
One 64mW 2.4GHz scanning radio with mobility 
software features 
Table 2.   COASTS 2006 MeshDynamics Mesh Module 









Number of Available 
Mini-PCI slots (1 – 
4) 
Backhaul Radio (A = 
802.11a, G = 802.11g) 
One number per 
available slot 
(0 = 64mW, 1 = 
400mW, remains 
“0” if radio 
not installed) 
Number of installed 
radios (1 – 4) 
Service Radio (B = 
802.11b, G = 802.11g,  
I = 802.11b/g  ) 
One number per 
available slot 
(0 = 64mW, 1 = 
400mW, remains 
“0” if radio 
not installed) 
Backhaul Frequency 
(2 = 2.4GHz, 5 = 
5.8GHz) 
(x = no radio) One number per 
available slot 
(0 = 64mW, 1 = 
400mW, remains 
“0” if radio 
not installed) 
Software Features 
(0 = Basic, 2 = 




One number per 
available slot 
(0 = 64mW, 1 = 
400mW, remains 
“0” if radio 
not installed) 
Table 3.   MeshDynamics Mesh Module Model Number Breakdown 
(From: Lounsbury 2006) 
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D.  ANTENNAS AND RADIOS 
To clarify future chapters, this section provides 
technical information about the various antennas and radios 
used in this research. 
As mentioned previously, one of the key 
characteristics of the MeshDynamics 802.11 Multiple-Radio 
Mesh Modules is the ease of configuration and the ability 
to utilize multiple radios  The radios can vary in 
transmitted power output and frequency range.  The 
flexibility of the MeshDynamics modules is further enhanced 
by changing the antenna configuration based upon network 
performance requirements and client distribution. The 
COASTS 2006 network topology was composed of ground, air, 
and sea clients.  As a result, various types of antennas 
were used, including directional, omni-directional 
sectored, and multi-polar.   
Since most of the equipment, especially the MD Mesh 
Module, used by the COASTS 2006 team was new, it was never 
integrated in the topology configuration used during the 
COASTS 2005 field experiments.  As a result, it was 
necessary to conduct numerous test sessions in order to 
find an optimal antenna and radio configuration.   
The three different radios used during testing by the 
COASTS 2006 team were the Ubiquiti Networks SuperRange2 
(400mW) 2.4GHz radio (Figure 9), the Ubiquiti Networks, 
SuperRange 5 (400mW) 5.8GHz radio (Figure 10), and the 
Winstrum (64mW) 2.4GHz radio.  The radios that operate in 




The radios that operated in the 5.8GHz range were used as 
backhaul radios, including both upstream and downstream 
links. 
  
Figure 9.   Ubiquiti SuperRange2 Radio (left) and 
SuperRange2 Specifications (right) (From: 
http://www.comnet.com.au/Ubiquiti/SR2.htm 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
  
Figure 10.   Ubiquiti SuperRange5 Radio (left) and 
SuperRange5 Specifications (right) (From: 
http://www.comnet.com.au/Ubiquiti/SR5.htm 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
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Before deciding on the optimal antenna configurations, 
the COASTS 2006 team tested a wide variety of different 
antennas and deployment topologies.  One of the 
recommendations taken from the COASTS 2005 After Action 
Report was to use an 8-dbi omni-directional antenna. This 
antenna, seen below in Figure 11, provided the most 
effective configuration during the COASTS 2005 field 




Figure 11.   SuperPass 8dbi Omni-directional 
Antenna(left) and 8dbi Antenna Beamwidths (From: 
http://www.superpass.com/SPDJ6O.html accessed 
June 8, 2006 ) 
 
No ITEM TYPICAL 
1. Frequency Range 5250 – 5900 MHz 
2. Impedance 50 Ohms 
3. VSWR (or Return Loss)  1.5:1 ( or  14dB) 
4. Gain 8dBi 
5. Polarization Vertical, Linear 
6. 3dB Horizontal Beamwidth 360 deg. 
7. 3dB Vertical Beamwidth 18 deg. 
8. Max. Power Input 20W 
9. Connector N female 
10. Size 10" x 1" 
11. Housing Material Fiber-Glass 
12. Temperature Range -45 to +75  C 
 
Table 4.   SuperPass 8dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
Specifications (From: 
http://www.superpass.com/SPDJ6O.html accessed June 
8, 2006) 
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Another antenna that was tested extensively by both 
the COASTS 2005 and 2006 teams was the WiFi-Plus 5dbi, 
multi-polar, omni-directional antenna (Figure 12 and 13).  
This antenna has a high-gain, near-the-horizon, vertically 
polarized signal and a dual/multi-polarized lobe that 
continues up to 90 degrees elevation (Lee 2005, 40).  This 
antenna proved to be one of the most effective antennas 
when it was used as part of the balloon payload.  In COASTS 




Figure 12.   WiFi-Plus 5dbi Antenna (From: 
http://www.wifi-
plus.com/images/WFP0200507tearsheet.doc accessed 
June 8, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 13.   5dbi Antenna Beamwidths (From: 
http://www.wifi-
plus.com/images/WFP0200507tearsheet.doc accessed 
June 8, 2006) 
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Three other antennas were also tested: 
• SuperPass 9dbi – 2.4GHz Omni-directional antenna 
(Figure 14) 
• HyperLink 12dbi – 5.8GHz Omni-directional antenna 
(Figure 15) 
• WiFi-Plus 13dbi – 2.4GHz and 5.8GHz Omni-
directional antenna. (Figure 16) 
 
     
Figure 14.   SuperPass 9dbi Antenna (From: 
http://www.superpass.com/SPDG8O.html accessed 
June 8, 2006) 
 
   
Figure 15.   Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
(From: 
http://www.hyperlinktech.com/web/hg5812u_pro.php 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
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Figure 16.   WIFI-PLUS 13dbi Multi-Polar Antenna (From: 
http://www.wifi-
plus.com/images/SpecsSingleSector2.pdf accessed 
June 8, 2006) 
 
The specific configurations of antennas and radios that 
were used throughout the COASTS 2006 field tests are 
discussed in Chapter V of this thesis. 
E.  AP MESHVIEWER 
It was critical to constantly monitor the status of 
the network in real-time.  This was accomplished using 
MeshDynamics AP Meshviewer software, enabling efficient 
data collection and overall network management.  A sample 




Figure 17.   Screen Shot of AP Meshviewer (From: 
http://www.meshdynamics.com/WNetworkMgr.html 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
The characteristics that made AP Meshviewer such an 
advantageous tool during COASTS 2006 field experimentation 
and testing and evaluation were as follows: 
• LED Status Lights: LEDs on nodes provide a 
composite view of overall state of the network. 
• Multiple Network Tabs: Ensures that nodes mesh 
with only nodes in the same logical network. 
• Configuration of VLAN, Security, SSID settings, 
including hidden SSID.  
• Configuration of Radio Transmit Power Control and 
ACK timing on a per radio basis 
• Ability to change the 2.4G service radio mode to 
11b, 11b and 11g or only 11g   
(http://www.meshdynamics.com/WNetworkMgr.html 
accessed June 6, 2006).  
In terms of data collection and network analysis, this 
software allows users to gather information, such as board 
temperatures, throughput rates, signal strength, individual 
node activity, and node associations.  Another beneficial 
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feature is the ability to view the network’s actual 
topology, or to display it as a map.  The topology view 
displays how each of the nodes is connected to one other. 
The map view allows the user to place a map image in the 
background and actually move the nodes to where they are 
located on the map. Both of these views are captured in 
Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18.   AP Meshviewer Map and Topology Views (From: 
http://www.meshdynamics.com/WNetworkMgr.html 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
F.  IXCHARIOT 
The primary piece of software used for data collection 
throughout the 2006 field experiments was Ix Chariot.  The 
software is a product of the Ixia company, a leading 
provider of performance test systems for IP-based 





Figure 19.   Figure 19: Visual Description of How 
IxChariot Runs Tests (From: 
http://www.ixiacom.com/products/display?skey=ixc
hariot accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
Ixia’s IxChariot is the industry's leading test tool 
for emulating real-world applications to predict device and 
system performance under realistic load conditions 
(http://www.ixiacom.com/products/display?skey=ixchariot).  
With each test, the software sends traffic over the network 
to evaluate how the network performs.  The results of each 
test include throughput, latency, and transaction rate 
data, along with a graph that has throughput data points 
plotted.  Figure 19 gives a visual description of how 
IxChariot runs a test.  
Each testing session required the use of at least two 
clients.  One client’s console was running the IxChariot 
software while the other client was running IxChariot 
Endpoint software.  The IX Chariot console can only 




software.  The console running IxChariot was positioned in 
the mobile command post and the console running Endpoint 
was located in the field of operations.   
One of the characteristics of the IxChariot software 
that made it such an advantageous tool was its ability to 
provide several thousand data points over the course of one 
day’s testing.  This abundance of data makes it possible 
for users to perform in-depth analysis of overall network 
performance, as well as specifics such as, throughput, 
latency, and transaction rate.  The COASTS 2006 team took 
advantage of this software as a data collection tool and 
used the information gathered to try and optimize the 
performance of the network.   
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IV. PREPARATION AND NETWORK DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
Planning for the COASTS 2006 deployment to Thailand 
began with a proposed counter-drug scenario underpinned by 
key research and development components such as wireless 
network technology, mini UAVs, global positioning system, 
and other elements as jointly developed with the Thai 
military.  Subsequent to scenario development and the 
configuration of supporting technologies, a network 
topology and an overall test plan was generated. Coupled 
with the recommendations and lessons learned from the 
COASTS 2005 deployment, this year’s team generated the 
topology shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20.   COASTS 2006 Planned Topology 
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This network is designed to be robust, rapidly 
deployable, modular, and reconfigurable to meet all the 
needs of tactical, operational, theater and strategic level 
decision makers in coalition environments (COASTS 2006 
CONOP).  The topology was designed to form a wi-fi cloud of 
network coverage over the entire area of operations. This 
network cloud serves as an information database that allows 
all approved users to either take information from it or 
put information into it.  It is a C4ISR architecture that 
supports air, ground, and maritime forces.   
The wi-fi cloud topology incorporates seven 
strategically placed MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh 
Modules (wireless access points (AP)) providing 
connectivity for the tactical user.  One AP, designated as 
the root node, was located at the north-east end of the Mae 
Ngat Dam face at the tactical operations center (TOC), 
three other APs were deployed along the dam face at .4 mile 
intervals as intermediate ground nodes, while the remaining 
three APs were deployed in the air as part of a payload 
suspended to tethered helium balloons.  This deployment of 
APs created a meshed network designed to act as a gateway 
for individual clients to share information with any and 
all users simultaneously, and in real-time.  The 802.11 
mesh, communicating directly with the TOC, was linked to 
two command and control (C2) centers – the first C2 center 
was located at Wing 41 at the Royal Thai Air Force base in 
Chiang Mai and the second was located north of Chiang Mai 
at the Royal Thai Army Intelligence and Information Fusion 
Center (IIFC) - via two separate and encrypted 802.16 
links.  From Wing 41, data was transferred to the Royal 
Thai Air Force headquarters in Bangkok and ultimately sent 
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via a VPN tunnel back to the Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Center (MIFC) in Alameda, CA.  This global topology is 
depicted in Figure 21 below. 
 
 
Figure 21.   COASTS 2006 Global Topology 
 
Immediately following the COASTS 2006 initial planning 
phase, several small-scale field tests and individual 
technology assessments began.  The COASTS 2005 iterations 
identified several shortfalls and limitations regarding 
network equipment performance which prompted a 
comprehensive market study to identify alternative, 
commercially available, low-cost applications. The end 
result of this search was the large scale purchase of new 
equipment, which in turn necessitated extensive field 
testing and integration concerns.   
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Due to constraints imposed by the larger Department of 
Defense funding process, the initial stages of the COASTS 
2006 field experimentation program were limited by the 
availability of required hardware and software.  This 
inability to acquire all of the necessary networking 
equipment was overcome by partially testing and evaluating 
smaller subsets.  The early testing and evaluation was done 
in conjunction with the COASTS partner companies of 
MeshDynamics and Mercury Data Systems.    
It is well understood that two important governing 
factors of wireless network performance are the radiated 
power and the sensitivity of the antennas.  Since in the US 
the FCC regulates the maximum power output to one Watt, 
COASTS research efforts focused more heavily on antenna 
configuration.  Underpinning this premise was the objective 
to develop a network that was both redundant and 
overlapping. To this end, a critical measure of performance 
was the throughput and range limitations for each device 
associated with the network.  Other areas of interest 
encompassed client range testing, as well as theoretical 
and empirical determination of the maximum number of 
clients associated with a single AP, given the operational 
requirements imposed by Tactical and Remote Operations 
Centers.      
This chapter first discusses the methodology used for 
network deployment during each of the four COASTS 2006 
field testing iterations.  These field tests included: 
• Point Sur, CA – December 2005 
• Fort Ord, CA – January 2006 
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• Fort Hunter Liggett, CA – February 2006 
• Mae Ngat Dam (North of Chiang Mai, Thailand) – 
March 2006. 
B.  METHODOLOGY 
Performing tests that produced reliable data, and from 
which predictive models could be constructed, relied 
heavily on the elements of repetition and consistency.  In 
addition, particular attention was given to any single 
outlying data point and its effect on the data analysis of 
a series of tests.  To account for the impact of outlying 
data points, each individual configuration resulted in 
multiple iterations (in most cases six identical trials was 
preferred) of the test in order to accumulate a suitably 
large collection of data points.  With this guideline in 
place, the multiple trials consumed large amounts of test 
time – certainly longer than anticipated in the planning 
phase.   
Antenna testing (primarily throughput and range-
testing) conducted at each field experiment was tedious.  
Typically, and for each configuration evaluated, the 
network consisted of a root node, a downstream node, and a 
client.  As with the actual network topology deployment, 
the root node, positioned next to the Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC), was physically wired to a Cisco 2811 router 
and was powered through its power-over-Ethernet port.  The 
antenna being tested was then connected to the 5.8GHz 
downstream, backhaul radio through the downstream antenna 
port, port 1 (Figure 7).  The downstream node was 
configured with one 5.8GHz upstream, backhaul radio, or 
with one 5.8GHz upstream, backhaul radio and one 2.4GHz 
service radio.  The antenna being tested was then attached 
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to the upstream radio through the upstream antenna port, 
port 0 (Figure 7).  Because the downstream node was 
positioned far from the TOC, it was powered by an UltraLife 
UBI 2590, 30V lithium ion battery.  Finally, a client, 
usually a laptop running the IxChariot Endpoint software, 
was physically wired to another Ethernet port on the 
MeshDynamics Mesh Module, which was being used as the 
downstream node.  As discussed in Chapter III, one common 
feature of all COASTS throughput testing and evaluation 
protocols mandated a client running IxChariot’s Endpoint 
software in order for the throughput data to be collected.  
However for range testing, the client did not have to be 
running Endpoint. 
Both the root node and downstream node were mounted at 
the same elevation (typically between ten and twelve feet 
in the air on wood or metal tripods).  The position of the 
root node remained constant while the downstream node was 
placed on a ground vehicle so that it could be easily moved 
away from the root node and down the testing field.  The 
client was also co-located with the ground vehicle, since 
it was physically attached to the downstream node. 
For each test, and to baseline the current 
configuration, an initial IxChariot throughput test was run 
with the downstream node stationed approximately ten feet 
away from the root node.  Then a separate test was run each 
time that the downstream node was moved farther from the 
root node at .05 and .1 mile intervals, depending on the 
results of the previous trial.   
In addition to specific antennae range and throughput 
testing, large allocations of time were spent on testing 
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the 802.11 network topology as a whole.  Different 
configurations were used on different nodes in order to 
establish the most redundant and reliable wireless meshed 
network possible.  Eventually, the establishment of a solid 
ground network allowed testing to address the aerial 
environment.  Past attempts to connect ground nodes with 
aerial nodes (deployed to tethered balloons at altitudes of 
2,000 feet or more) were met with limited success.  As a 
result, much time and effort went into the COASTS 2006 
planning and testing phases.  Planning began with the 
selection of suitable testing locations within the vicinity 
of NPS.  The most important physical characteristic of the 
terrain sought was a long, flat, clear strip of land.  This 
was important for two reasons: 
• To avoid antenna alignment problems caused by 
elevation differences 
• To closely approximate the area where the 
topology would be deployed and operating in 
northern Thailand, specifically along the flat, 
1.2 mile long top of the Mae Ngat Dam.   
Detailed planning was followed by several testing 
iterations, resulting in the establishment of a fully 
integrated air, land, and sea wireless network that 
surpassed the success of the COASTS 2005 iteration. 
C. GROUND NODE DEPLOYMENT 
Based on the initial field testing of the MeshDynamics 
Mesh Modules, it was determined that the network topology 
required additional nodes to be deployed on the ground to 
provide a more dependable and redundant meshed network.  
During the testing sessions at Point Sur, Fort Ord, and 
Fort Hunter-Liggett, ground nodes were deployed on tripods 
(Figure 22) mounted to wood platforms to a height of twelve 
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feet.  At the Mae Ngat Dam, the ground nodes were mounted 
on metal light poles (Figure 23) at a height of about 
thirty feet. The ground nodes were elevated to prevent any 
obstructions in the Fresnel zone (an elliptical region 
surrounding the line-of-sight path between transmitting and 
receiving antennas) around the antennas.  This zone must be 








Figure 23.   Ground Node Deployment on Light Post 
 
Each of the ground nodes, with the exception of the 
root node, was powered by a UBI-2590 battery, just as were 
the aerial payloads.  The root node, which was located next 
to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), was physically 
connected to a Cisco 2811 router and powered through a 
power-over-Ethernet (PoE) adapter.   
D.  AERIAL NODE DEPLOYMENT 
The reason for deploying wireless APs into the air 
with tethered helium-filled balloons was to extend the 
range of the 802.11 network, allowing multiple ground-, 
water-, and air-based clients to communicate with the 
network.  As demonstrated by the COASTS 2005 team, aerial 
payloads also provide improved situational awareness of the 
local environment when the payloads are equipped with 
wireless IP-cameras.  These cameras provide live streaming 
video of the surrounding area, which can be seen by all 
clients associated with the network.  When using these 
aerial payloads in a hostile environment, there is a higher 
chance of one of the payloads being destroyed or damaged.  
The loss of the aerial nodes will not cause the entire 
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wireless meshed network to fail, however the network will 
lose certain ISR assets, as well as its ability to extend 
to higher elevations.  Whereas the COASTS 2005 team only 
deployed one aerial payload into its network topology, with 
limited success, the COASTS 2006 team deployed multiple 
aerial 802.11 payloads simultaneously. 
The past twelve months of field experimentation, both 
locally and abroad, resulted in numerous lessons learned, 
and coupled with the recommendations from the COASTS 2005 
AAR, led to the construction of a new payload design and 
configuration that was used extensively during the COASTS 
2006 aerial node deployment.     
1.  Balloon 
The following lessons learned were taken from the 
appropriate sections of the COASTS 2005 AAR: 
• The balloon is ideally operated during moderate 
winds below 10 knots.  Winds greater than 10 
knots must be in a consistent direction. 
•  This is not an all-weather balloon.  Extreme 
heat and solar conditions causes some 
deterioration of balloon material.  
• Maintaining a stable video image from the balloon 
is very difficult at low altitudes. Stability 
lines from the payload to the balloon tether are 
needed. 
• The extreme heat (100+ F) and intense sunlight of 
Lop Buri, Thailand, also caused some 
deterioration of balloon material.  The valve 
connection lost its adhesiveness during 
operations, which caused air to leak from the 
balloon.  Due to the location of the valve and 
unfamiliarity of the proper position during 
operations, uncontrolled leakage of air occurred 
during balloon operations. 
• Without wind, the Sky-Doc balloon only lifts 16.8 
lbs. 
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These lessons learned led to the purchase of a relatively 
low cost 10-foot, sphere-shaped, helium balloon from the 
commercial company BlimpWorks (Figure 24).  
 
 
Figure 24.   COASTS 2006 Balloon 
 
The advertised lift for this balloon was 23.8 pounds.  
However, based on empirical testing, and to account for the 
fact that the Mean Sea Level altitude of Chiang Mai is 
approximately 1,200 feet, and that the density altitude is 
3,000 to 5,000 feet (depending on temperature and other 
conditions), the actual lift capability of a fixed-sphere 
balloon is reduced when compared to the sea-level 
capability on a standard day.  As a result, the payload was 
designed and constructed with the assumption that the 
balloon had no more than 14 pounds of lift.     
2.  Platform  
The platforms that were constructed for the COASTS 
2006 field experiments were based on the design used by LT 
Chris Lee during the COASTS 2005 iteration.  The platforms 
housed two helium tanks and the winch that was used to 
raise and to lower the balloon.  The platforms also served 
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as anchor points for securing the balloons at the end of 
each day’s field work.  Figure 25 below shows the platform, 
winch, and helium tanks.   
 
 
Figure 25.   Platform with Helium and Winch 
 
3.  Payload 
The payload (Figure 26) employed for this year’s field 
experiments was based on the MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-
Radio Mesh Modules.  Throughout the various field-test 
iterations, the payload was continuously reconfigured with 
different radios, antennas, and cameras to find an optimal 
solution for network connectivity. The different 
configurations that were used for each testing session are 
discussed in the remaining sections of this chapter.   
The main elements of the payload included: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 5.8GHz backhaul radios and one 
2.4GHz service radio.   
• One Axis-213 Pan-Zoom-Tilt IP Camera 
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• One Ultralife UBI-2590 Battery 
• 3 Omni-directional antennas (varied throughout 
field testing iterations).  
 
 
Figure 26.   Fully Assembled Payload (From: Lounsbury 
2005) 
 
The payload design used for COASTS 2006 was designed by 1st 
LT Rob Lounsbury.  
E.   POSSIBLE FUTURE RIVERINE OPERATIONS TOPOLOGY 
The topology used by the COASTS 2006 team at the Mae 
Ngat Dam had a coverage area of approximately one mile by 
.5 mile.  With the TOC and primary network nodes located on 
the dam face, there was not much network coverage further 
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upstream along the river that runs through the Mae Ngat  
Dam.  Figure 27 below gives a view of the Mae Ngat Dam, as 
well as, the first three miles of the river flowing from 
the east of the dam.   
 
 
Figure 27.   Mae Ngat Dam and River with Current and 
Future Network Coverage Areas 
 
In riverine operations, one of the keys to success is 
having as much situational awareness as possible.  In the 
COASTS 2006 network demonstration, the team was able to 
establish an architecture that provided outstanding 
situational awareness of the area surrounding the Mae Ngat 
Dam.  However, the river flowing to the dam extends over 
five miles to the east of the dam.  In a riverine operation 
involving enemy forces that may provide more of a threat 
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than drug smugglers, the geographically limited amount of 
coverage currently provided by the COASTS 2006 network may 
not be enough to anticipate and prevent an attack.  As a 
result it may be necessary but feasible to extend the 
network’s coverage further upstream.  Figure 27 above shows 
the current coverage area of the COASTS 2006 network, as 
well as, some possible locations for the placement of more 
network nodes that could extend the range of the network 
further upstream.   
By extending the range of the network further 
upstream, riverine boat units, ground units, and UAVs would 
be able to surveil and patrol larger areas and create a 
greater sense of situational awareness for all of the 
networks users.  This new topology may also require either 
a mobile operations center, or another fixed operations 
center further upstream that can serve as the launch site 
for boat units or UAVs that can take early action against 
any possible threats.     
The characteristics of the COASTS network that make it 
so advantageous are that it is ad-hoc, mobile and rapidly 
deployable.  With these characteristics, the users gain the 
ability to adjust the size or location of the network when 
desired.  The COASTS 2006 team took advantage of this 
ability during its deployments to four different locations.  
The methodology for deploying the 802.11 wireless meshed 
network discussed in this chapter was modified throughout 
the different field testing iterations as explained in 
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V.  FIELD TESTING ITERATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to divide the 
individual field testing iterations into terrain, weather, 
objectives, topology, field tests, and results.  The 
overall methodology used for the field tests was discussed 
previously in Chapter IV.   
A.  POINT SUR 
The first field tests performed by the COASTS 2006 
team took place at a former Navy facility located at Point 
Sur, California (Figure 30).     
1.  Terrain 
The area of operations at Point Sur (Figures 28 and 
29) was a small plot of land consisting of two paved roads 
within several rolling hills, surrounded by metal fencing.  
The northeastern border was surrounded by the Pacific Coast 
Highway and the coastal mountain range.  The remaining 
borders were surrounded by the Pacific Ocean.  This setup 
made for ideal scenery but not ideal testing conditions.  
The following two figures give a better view of the area of 
operations at Point Sur, CA. 
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Figure 28.   Point Sur Area of Operations Terrain Contour 
(From: Google Earth 2006) 
 
 
Figure 29.   Overhead View of Point Sur Area of 
Operations (From: http://local.live.com/ 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
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Figure 30.   Point Sur Navy Facility (left) and 
Surrounding Terrain (right) 
 
2.  Weather 
Throughout the course of the field testing iteration 
at Point Sur, the weather conditions varied.  On a majority 
of the days the weather conditions were excellent, with 
temperatures in the sixties, no precipitation, and minimal 
wind speeds.  However, the first day of testing consisted 
of surface winds reaching up to around 15 knots.  As a 
result of these wind conditions, the COASTS team was unable 
to set up the topology to include the aerial payloads on 
this day.  Another day of testing encountered light 
precipitation and temperatures in the low fifties.  
However, the COASTS team was still able to conduct testing 
despite the slightly adverse weather conditions.  Below, 
Table 5 gives the specific weather data from the operating 








DATE    TEMP   (F) DEW POINT (F) WIND SPEED HUMIDITY 
  MAX 55 43 12 93 
3-Dec-05 MIN 39 32 0 51 
  AVERAGE 47 38 6 74 
  MAX 60 40 10 79 
4-Dec-05 MIN 37 25 0 26 
  AVERAGE 48 32 7 58 
  MAX 63 46 9 83 
5-Dec-05 MIN 34 27 0 26 
  AVERAGE 48 34 3 62 
  MAX 61 42 12 80 
6-Dec-05 MIN 37 27 0 27 
  AVERAGE 49 33 8 64 
  MAX 57 47 8 86 
7-Dec-05 MIN 37 29 0 42 
  AVERAGE 47 36 5 68 
  MAX 57 52 9 100 
8-Dec-05 MIN 46 45 0 81 
  AVERAGE 52 46 5 90 
  MAX 64 44 13 93 
9-Dec-05 MIN 42 32 0 35 
  AVERAGE 53 39 4 62 
 
Table 5.   Weather Conditions at Point Sur, CA from 03DEC – 
09DEC 
 
3.  Objectives 
The goals and objectives of the field experiments at 
Point Sur, in terms of the 802.11 network, included the 
following: 
• Demonstrating the ability to mesh both aerial and 
ground MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-radio Mesh 
Modules to create a seamless 802.11 mesh network 
• Testing a variety of aerial payload 
configurations to ascertain optimum performance  
• Ascertaining network performance with a varying 
number of ground-based clients. 
Since Point Sur was the first of four field-test 
iterations, it was also very important that the team became 
familiar with all of the testing equipment.  This was the 
first time that the 802.11 network was deployed in the 
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field, and it was important to begin establishing an 
efficient testing and evaluation procedure for future 
experimentation. 
4.  Topology 
Because of the small amount of open land and uneven 
terrain, Pt. Sur did not serve as an ideal location for 
testing the network topology.  This topology was composed 
of two aerial nodes and six ground nodes.   
 
 
Figure 31.   Aerial Node Deployed at Pt. Sur 
 
The two aerial nodes (Figure 31) were configured with the 
following: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 5.8GHz backhaul radios and one 
2.4GHz service radio   
• One Axis-213 PZT IP Camera 
• One Ultralife UBI-2590 Battery 
• One 11.1 V Lithium-Polymer Camera Battery 
• Two SuperPass 8dbi Omni-directional Antennas 
(Figure 11) 
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• One Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
(Figure 15). 
The ground nodes had various configurations; the root node 
was composed of: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 2.4GHz service radios and one 
5.8GHz backhaul radio   
• One Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
connected to the downstream radio. 
The other ground nodes were composed of: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 5.8GHz backhaul radios and one 
2.4GHz service radio.   
• Ultralife UBI-2590 Battery 
• Two SuperPass 8dbi Omni-directional Antennas  
• One Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna. 
Because the operations area was not representative of 
the Mae Ngat Dam face, the setup of the ground and aerial 
nodes did not resemble the planned topology that would 
later be used in Thailand.  The ground nodes were dispersed 
around the area perimeter, with the two aerial nodes in the 
center, approximately .25 miles apart.   
5.  Field Tests 
Despite the relatively open area that was available at 
Point Sur, the area most suitable for the deployment of the 
mesh network still exhibited a gradual increase in 
elevation (refer to Figure 32 below).  This fact made range 
and throughput testing for the mesh modules less than 
optimal.  In addition, the presence of a metal fence and 
gate that ran perpendicular to the Line-Of-Sight (LOS) 
between two nodes may have decreased the network 
performance slightly.  The individual field tests that were 




Figure 32.   Sloped Road Used for 802.11 Ground Node 




802.11 Test I – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 12dBi Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provide acceptable 
throughput using 12dBi omni antennae for 
backhaul 
802.11 Test II – 
Ground-to- Client 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 12dBi and 8dBi Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provide acceptable 
throughput using 12dBi  and 8dBi omni antennas 
for backhaul 
802.11 Test III – 
Ground-to-Air 
Throughput w/ 12dBi 
and 8dBi 
Determine the throughput between ground and 
aerial access points w/ 12dBi and 8dBi omni 
antennas (Balloon elevation = 500ft) 
802.11 Test IV – 
Ground-to-Air 
Throughput w/ 12dBi 
and 8dBi 
Determine the throughput between ground and 
aerial access points w/ 12dBi and 8dBi omni 
antennas (Balloon elevation = 1000ft) 
 
Table 6.   802.11 Field Tests Performed at Point Sur 
 
6.  Results 
The field tests at Point Sur provided a suitable 
starting point for the COASTS 2006 team.  Most of the 
objectives for the 802.11 network were achieved; however, a 
lack of equipment and terrain issues prevented the team 
from achieving all of its goals. 
The objectives that were achieved included: 
• Establishment of a robust reliable ground 802.11 
mesh network using as many as five MeshDynamics 
802.11 Mesh Modules simultaneously 
• Establishment and testing of an aerial 802.11 
mesh network 
• Testing and evaluation of other technologies such 
as inertial tracking and devices and shared 
situational awareness applications 
• Integration of wireless IP cameras in conjunction 
with both ground and aerial nodes and then 
measuring the impact of streaming video across 
the network  
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• Testing of various antenna configurations and 
then measuring the impact on network performance 
The most reliable piece of the 802.11 mesh network was 
far and away the ground-based elements.  Once the ground 
nodes were configured, they were quickly deployed 
throughout the operating area.  The ground network’s 
performance was fairly consistent, with an average 
throughput of roughly ten megabits per second (mbps).  The 
maximum advertised throughput for the MeshDynamics 802.11 
Multi-Radio Mesh Modules is 54mbps; however, at 10mbps the 
ground network still supported real-time command and 
control.  Throughout the Point Sur field experiment, the 
ground-node configuration that resulted in the best network 
performance was usage of the 12dBi omni antenna affixed to 
the backhaul, 5.8GHz radio on the root node and the use of 
8dBi omni antennas affixed to the backhaul radios, both 
uplink and downlink, on the four other ground nodes.   
Once the ground network was firmly established, 
streaming video from a wireless IP camera was injected onto 
the network.  One major advantage of the MeshDynamics Mesh 
Modules was the ability to directly connect external 
devices, such as the IP cameras, via a Cat5 LAN cable.  
Capturing video from one camera and analyzing the effects 
respective to network performance was a good starting 
point, but due to time constraints, the testing of multiple 
cameras was not completed and was therefore scheduled for 
the next iteration of testing.    
The aerial 802.11 mesh network consisted of two aerial 
payloads.  The payloads were configured as discussed 
earlier in this chapter; with the exception that only one 
payload was equipped with a wireless IP camera.  This 
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topology achieved acceptable throughput between the root 
node and aerial payloads for several hours, with the 
balloons positioned at an elevation of approximately 1,400 
feet.  The root node was configured with the WiFi Plus 
17dBi directional antennas affixed to the backhaul radios, 
and the aerial nodes were configured with the Hyperlink 
12dBi omni antennas affixed to the backhaul radios.  
Unfortunately, connectivity between the ground and aerial 
nodes only occurred during the first day of testing.  
Ultimately the reliability of this aerial mesh network was 
not demonstrated, as connectivity could not be established 
during the subsequent days of testing.    
This field testing iteration brought to light several 
unresolved items which would require further testing in the 
upcoming three iterations.  A few of these items were: 
• Can the ground network be robust enough to 
support more than one ground client, in 
particular the wireless IP cameras? 
• What is the optimal antenna configuration for the 
nodes?  Due to the limited selection of antennas 
at Point Sur this became a high priority item. 
B. FORT ORD 
The second iteration of the field tests took place at 
Fort Ord, California, from 13 through 15 January 2006, but 
due to local air restrictions, the COASTS 2006 team was not 
able to fly aerial payloads for the 802.11 network testing.  
As a result, testing focused exclusively on the performance 
of the ground nodes.  Network testing with the aerial nodes 
resumed at the field testing iteration at Fort Hunter 




1.  Terrain 
The area of operations at Fort Ord for the ground 
range and throughput testing was longer and flatter than 
the road used at Pt. Sur.  This allowed for more optimal 
testing and better mimicked the terrain in Thailand.  
However, the Fort Ord area was also surrounded by abandoned 
US military housing structures, which did not allow for a 
wide open test area.  Figure 33 below gives a more detailed 
view of the Fort Ord test area.  
 
 
Figure 33.   Fort Ord Area of Operations (From: 






2.  Weather 
The weather conditions at Fort Ord, CA are shown below 
in Table 7.  The COASTS team encountered one day of 
precipitation during the three days of operations.  
 
DATE    TEMP (F) Dew Point WIND SPEED HUMIDITY 
  MAX 64 51 28 83 
13-Jan-06 MIN 46 42 0 54 
  AVERAGE 55 44 16 73 
  MAX 54 48 18 93 
14-Jan-06 MIN 44 42 0 71 
  AVERAGE 50 48 9 84 
  MAX 55 42 13 97 
15-Jan-06 MIN 37 33 0 43 
  AVERAGE 46 39 2 76 
 
Table 7.   Weather Conditions at Fort Ord, CA from 13JAN – 
15JAN 
 
3.  Objectives 
The goals and objectives of the COASTS 2006 field 
experiments at Fort Ord, in terms of the 802.11 network, 
included the following: 
• Demonstrating the ability to create a seamless 
802.11 mesh network mesh on the ground using 
MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-radio Mesh Modules  
• Testing a variety of ground-node configurations 
to ascertain optimum performance  
• Range testing various antennae configurations to 
determine the best configuration for maximum 
throughput. 
Because of the restrictions on using aerial payloads 
at Fort Ord, the team was able to focus entirely on the 
802.11 ground network.   
Accompanying the NPS faculty and students was Tom 
Dietz, a civilian contractor from the MeshDynamics company.  
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Mr. Dietz’ extensive knowledge of wireless technology, in 
particular the MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-radio Mesh 
Modules, made him invaluable to the COASTS team during the 
Fort Ord testing iteration.       
4.  Topology 
A sloping terrain had to be accounted for to ensure 
the ground nodes were positioned at the same elevation.  
The distances between the four ground nodes also varied in 
order to prevent the buildings from obstructing the open 
space that is required between nodes.  The distance from 
the root node to node two was approximately 0.3 of a mile, 
the distance from node two to node three was about 0.12 of 
a mile, and there was about 0.4 of a mile between node 
three and node four.  Also, because of the elevation 
changes and buildings in the area, node three was 
configured with the two 17 dBi directional antennas.  One 
of the antennas was connected to the downstream radio 
(backhaul) and was pointed to the fourth node, while the 
other antenna was connected to the upstream radio 
(backhaul) and was pointed back to the root node.  This 
adjustment allowed for all four ground nodes to connect to 
one another, establishing a full 802.11 ground wireless 
meshed network, in spite of the obstructions in the area of 
operations. 
5.  Field Tests 
The following table (Table 8) lists and describes the 









802.11 Test I – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ MP3dBi Vertical 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provides acceptable 
throughput using vertically mounted Multi-polar 
3dBi antennae for backhaul  
802.11 Test I – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ MP3dBi Horizontal 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provides acceptable 
throughput using horizontally mounted Multi-
polar 3dBi antennae aimed at each other for 
backhaul  
802.11 Test III – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 12dBi Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provides acceptable 
throughput using vertically polarized 12dBi 
omni antennae for backhaul  
802.11 Test IV – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 2.4GHz Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provide acceptable 
throughput using 2.4GHz radios and 2.4GHz omni 
antennae for backhaul   
 




Figure 34.   Fort Ord Range and Throughput Testing Track 
(Blue Line)(From: http://local.live.com/ 
accessed June 8, 2006) 
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The area used at Fort Ord for the ground range and 
throughput testing, depicted in Figure 34, was longer and 
flatter than the road used at Pt. Sur.  This allowed for 
more optimal testing and better mimicked the terrain in 
Thailand.  Figure 35 below depicts the set-up used for 
range and throughput testing at Fort Ord. 
 
 
Figure 35.   Ground Test Set-up at Fort Ord 
 
6. Results 
The field testing at Fort Ord resulted in the 
successful deployment of four MeshDynamics Mesh Modules 
acting as ground nodes; the throughput between all four 
nodes reached 54mbps.  Equally important, this was the 




resembled the topology that would be used at the Mae Ngat 
Dam.  Some other highlights from the testing at Fort Ord 
included: 
• Determined the best antenna to be used on the 
ground nodes, within the range limit of the 
operating area, was the 12dBi omni-directional 
antennas  
• Attained 54mbps of throughput between ground 
nodes that were separated 0.32 of a mile and 0.4 
of a mile 
• Upgraded the firmware for the MeshDynamics Mesh 
Modules that allowed for the adjustment of the 
acknowledgement timing setting  
The acknowledgement (ACK) time is the time that an 
access point will wait for a reply from a distant access 
point acknowledging that it received the previous 
transmission, or that it is ready to receive a 
transmission.  The ACK timing is measured in milliseconds 
(ms).  The greater the ACK timing value, theoretically, the 
greater the range over which two access points will be able 
to communicate.  According to MeshDynamics network 
engineers, if two of the access points are set with an ACK 
timing of 150ms, they should have no trouble communicating 
with a few miles of separation.  Because of the constrained 
size of the operating area, the empiral distance limits 
were not established.  Similarly, the limited size of the 
operating area also did not allow the team to test the 
maximum range of the antennas.   
Overall, the field testing at Fort Ord greatly 
improved the knowledge base relative to how to best deploy 




not able to test the aerial payloads, some crucial issues 
required resolution and were slated for the next testing 
iteration at Fort Hunter Liggett.  These items included: 
• Testing the maximum range of the MeshDynamics 
Mesh Modules using various antenna configurations 
• Establishing reliable ground/air connectivity 
• Simulating the intended topology that would be 
used at the Mae Ngat Dam in Thailand. 
C.  FORT HUNTER LIGGETT 
The third testing iteration took place at Fort Hunter 
Liggett (FHL), CA, from the 10th until the 18th of February 
2006.  The area of operations at FHL was an almost ideal 
location for 802.11 range and throughput testing, as well 
as network setup. 
1.  Terrain 
The area of operations (AO) was located on a one-mile 
long, dirt runway.  The change in elevation from one end of 
the runway to the other did not exceed ten feet.  The 
surrounding area was composed of woods and mountains. 
Figure 36 is a Google Earth image of the AO at FHL.  
 
Figure 36.   Fort Hunter Ligget Area of Operations (From: 
Google Earth 2006) 
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2.  Weather 
The temperature patterns throughout the course of 
field testing at FHL were fairly consistent.  Early morning 
temperatures averaged in the mid to low 40’s.  From 0900 
until around 1400, temperatures continually rose, usually 
increasing to the mid to upper 70’s.  With the exception of 
two days of operations, the winds never exceeded five knots 
during the hours of operation.  When winds approached ten 
knots, balloon operations were suspended because of balloon 
instability. Humidity was relatively low during the day, 
reaching highs of around 60% at night.  There was also no 
precipitation throughout the entire iteration of field 












 2/11/2006 23:20 49 35 59 N 2kts 
2/11/2006 22:20 54 35 49 NNW 2kts 
2/11/2006 21:20 52 32 47 WSW 1kts 
2/11/2006 19:20 58 36 44 NNE 2kts 
2/11/2006 18:20 62 37 40 NNE 3kts 
2/11/2006 17:20 69 39 33 NNE 6kts 
2/11/2006 16:20 77 27 16 ENE 5kts 
2/11/2006 15:20 75 34 22 ENE 4kts 
2/11/2006 14:20 77 29 17 NE 9kts 
2/11/2006 13:20 81 31 16 SE 3kts 
2/11/2006 12:20 78 27 15 S 2kts 
2/11/2006 11:20 76 29 18 ENE 2kts 
2/11/2006 10:20 69 33 26 SSE 2kts 
2/11/2006 9:20 64 37 36 SW 1kts 
2/11/2006 8:20 50 36 59 N 1kts 
2/11/2006 7:20 45 34 65 NNW 3kts 
2/11/2006 6:20 43 32 66 W 1kts 
2/11/2006 5:20 45 33 63 W 2kts 
2/11/2006 4:20 44 32 63 E 1kts 
2/11/2006 3:20 45 31 58 WNW 2kts 
2/11/2006 2:20 46 33 60 W 2kts 
2/11/2006 1:20 46 32 57 NNE 4kts 
2/11/2006 0:20 45 28 52 NNE 1kts 
 
Table 9.   Weather Conditions at Fort Hunter Liggett on 
11FEB2006 (From: 
http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/mesonet/getobext.php?wfo=mtr
&sid=FHLC1&num=48 accessed June 8, 2006) 
 
3.  Objectives 
After completing the testing iterations at Point Sur 
and Fort Ord, the COASTS team now had extensive hands-on 
experience with the preponderance of the equipment that 
would be used for the iterations at Fort Hunter Liggett, 
CA, and the Mae Ngat Dam in Thailand.  However, as 
discussed earlier, the operating areas at Point Sur and 
Fort Ord did not allow for the intended deployment of the 
full 802.11 network.  As a result, the goals and objectives 
of the FHL field testing iteration were 
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• To deliver a wireless mesh network, using both 
ground and aerial nodes, in order to enable 
seamless network connectivity for sensor and 
mobile client operations throughout the operating 
area 
• To develop an aerial payload that provides 
optimum connectivity with both aerial and ground 
clients. 
4.  Topology 
The ground network of the FHL network topology 
consisted of four nodes, including the root node.  The 
nodes were separated by a distance of 0.4 mile, starting 
with the root node located at the MCP. The root node was 
configured with the following: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 2.4GHz service radios and one 
5.8GHz backhaul radio   
• One Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
connected to the downstream radio. 
The second and third ground nodes, which were positioned 
0.4 and 0.8 of a mile away from the root node, 
respectively, were configured with the following: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 5.8GHz backhaul radios and one 
2.4GHz service radio   
• Ultralife UBI-2590 Battery 
• One SuperPass 9dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
attached to the service radio  
• Two Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antennas 
attached to the backhaul radios 
(upstream/downstream). 
The fourth node, which was located about 1.1 miles from the 




• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 2.4GHz service radios and one 
5.8GHz backhaul radio   
• One Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
connected to the upstream radio. 
The high gain of the 17dbi sector antennas, which were 
installed on the root node and on the fourth node, had both 
benefits and drawbacks.  The drawbacks stemmed from the 
fact that the antennas had a narrow beam width, resulting 
in the need to tune the antennas in the direction of the 
other ground nodes carefully.  The benefits of using these 
sector antennas was that they had a strong enough signal 
(concentrated energy) to communicate with both the balloons 
and other ground nodes at long distances (up to 1.2 miles), 
resulting in a solid structured mesh.   
The aerial nodes that were deployed at FHL were 
configured with the following: 
• MeshDynamics 802.11 Multi-Radio Mesh Module 
equipped with two 5.8GHz backhaul radios and one 
2.4GHz service radio   
• One Axis-213 PZT IP Camera 
• Ultralife UBI-2590 Battery 
• 11.1 V Lithium-Polymer Camera Battery 
• One SuperPass 9dbi Omni-directional Antenna 
connected to the service radio 
• Two Hyperlink 12dbi Omni-directional Antennas 
connected to the backhaul radios 
(upstream/downstream). 
5.  Field Tests 
The following table (Table 10) lists and describes the 





802.11 Test I – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 8dBi Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
access points that provides acceptable 
throughput using 8dBi omni antennae for 
backhaul  
802.11 Test II – 
Ground-to- Client 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 8dBi Omni 
Determine the maximum range possible between 
the first downstream access point (one hop) and 
a wireless client that provides acceptable 
throughput using vertically polarized 8dBi omni 
antennae for service 
802.11 Test III - Max 
Clients Per Node 
Determine the maximum number of clients that 
can be connected to a single AP (downstream 
node) that allows acceptable throughput 
802.11 Test IV – 
Ground-to-Air 
Establish connectivity between one root node 
and one aerial payload AP (using a 2.4GHz 
antennae connecting root service to aerial 
backhaul) to a distant aerial client at various 
altitudes 
 
Table 10.   802.11 Field Tests Performed at Fort Hunter 
Liggett 
 
6.  Results 
A combination of ideal terrain and excellent weather 
conditions resulted in a very successful testing iteration.  
There were several highlights that included the following: 
• Established a robust wireless mesh network that 
was composed of four ground nodes, two aerial 
nodes and produced 54mbps of throughput 
• Provide 802.11 client access to ground clients  
• Provided real-time video surveillance of the 
entire FHL operating area from two Axis 213 PZT 
wireless IP cameras from altitudes exceeding 
1,500 feet 
• Demonstrated a reliable 54mbps ground mesh 
network (see Figure 38 for view from MeshViewer) 
• Achieved acceptable throughput (averaging 18mbps) 
with Superpass 8dBi antennas being used on 
downstream client at a range of nearly one mile 
from the root node 
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• Demonstrated the ability to communicate with 
aerial access points at varying altitudes up to 
approximately 1,800 feet. 
The ability to capture live streaming video from 
multiple cameras demonstrated the increased capability of 
the 802.11 network at FHL from the Point Sur configuration. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the team was only 
able to get streaming video from one camera during the 
Point Sur field tests.  Also, at Point Sur the root node 
had to be pointed directly at the aerial payload in order 
to achieve connectivity.  However, at FHL both aerial 
payloads were associated with each and every ground access 
point, not just the root node.  Figure 37 gives a clear 
image of the video that was captured by one of the aerial 
payloads used at Fort Hunter Liggett. 
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Figure 37.   Screen Shot of Surveillance Video Taken by 
AXIS 213 PZT Camera 
 
Another highlight of the FHL iteration was the team’s 
ability to rapidly deploy the full meshed network 
consistently, and with repeatability each day.  A system 
was established that allowed the team to reconstitute the 
network, including the four ground nodes and two aerial 
nodes, across the area of operations within one hour each 
morning.  Figure 38 depicts a screen shot of the full 
802.11 network, with each node providing the full 54mbps 
throughput.  This screen shot was taken throughout the  
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course of testing at Fort Hunter Liggett and was proof of 




Figure 38.   MeshDynamics MeshViewer Screen Shot of Fort 
Hunter Liggett 802.11 Network 
 
The only unresolved items that remained at the 
conclusion of the Fort Hunter Liggett testing iteration 
were the need to test WiFi-Plus 13dBi multi-polar antennas, 
and to perform throughput testing from ground-to-air 
clients at varying altitudes.  Overall, the testing and 
evaluation at FHL was a major success.  The team was able 
to deploy an 802.11 air/ground wireless meshed network that 
was tactically relevant and almost identical to the one 




D.  MAE NGAT DAM 
1. Terrain 
The AO for the March 2006 field tests was located on 
the face of the Mae Ngat Dam, about 60 kilometers north of 
Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The road running along the top of 
the dam provided an almost ideal location to deploy the 
wireless APs.  Both the north- and south-eastern sides of 
the dam were heavily sloped. An aerial view of the dam and 
surrounding area is shown below in Figure 39. 
   
 




The weather conditions that the COASTS 2006 
encountered during the March deployment to the Mae Ngat Dam 
were extremely different from the conditions faced during 
previous testing iterations.  High temperatures, combined 
with low winds and high humidity, resulted in challenging 
working conditions.  However, the severe weather conditions 
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did offer the opportunity to test the network in harsh 
conditions.  Table 11 details the weather conditions at the 
Mae Ngat Dam during the March 2006 testing iteration. 
 
DATE    TEMP   (F) WIND      SPEED RELATIVE HUMIDITY
  MAX 101.60 8.70 63.90 
21-Mar-06 MIN 79.70 0.00 23.50 
 AVERAGE 91.05 0.28 38.80 
 MAX 107.20 1.60 76.00 
22-Mar-06 MIN 73.00 0.00 16.30 
 AVERAGE 89.86 0.02 32.76 
 MAX 100.10 0.00 78.30 
23-Mar-06 MIN 67.90 0.00 10.30 
 AVERAGE 90.13 0.00 32.93 
 MAX 111.10 4.80 65.70 
27-Mar-06 MIN 72.80 0.00 11.80 
 AVERAGE 96.70 0.88 24.95 
 MAX 109.20 7.00 70.60 
28-Mar-06 MIN 64.00 0.00 13.70 
 AVERAGE 80.46 1.18 38.49 
 MAX 96.90 2.30 76.40 
29-Mar-06 MIN 63.20 0.00 30.20 
  AVERAGE 80.56 0.12 46.52 
 
Table 11.   Weather Conditions at Mae Ngat Dam  
 
3.  Objectives 
The Mae Ngat Dam iteration was the culmination of all 
of the research and testing conducted during the previous 
months.  After the three previous California based field 
experiments, the deployment to the Mae Ngat Dam had one 
main objective: to constitute a reliable, fully integrated 
ground and aerial wireless meshed network to enable 
seamless network connectivity for sensor, UAV, and mobile 
client operations throughout the operating area and 
underpinning a counter-drug scenario.   
This iteration included the use of all of the 
individual nodes that were part of the COASTS 2006 project. 
The specific nodes used were 
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• 802.11 Aerial and Ground  
• 802.16  
• Deny GPS 
• Sensor Nets 
• UAVs. 
The overarching goal was to configure the network in 
such a way that would allow for each node or client to 
seamlessly enter and traverse the network. Once connected, 
network testing and mock scenarios were conducted, and 
ultimately the outputs of each individual node were to be 
accessible to any other element that was connected to the 
network.  
4.  Topology 
The backbone of the ground network for the Mae Ngat 
Dam field experiments consisted of four nodes, similar to 
the topology that was used during the FHL iteration.  
However, at one point, as many as nine MeshDynamics Mesh 
Modules were deployed as ground nodes to augment the 
structured mesh and to support the integration of 
unattended sensors.  These nodes included: 
• one Root Node 
• three Camera Nodes 
• three Intermediate Nodes 
• two Sensor Nodes. 
Throughout the ten days of testing, the configuration 
of the ground nodes was optimized and tuned to strengthen 
network performance and reliability. 
Tables 12, 13 and 14 break the configurations down 
into radio use (upstream, downstream, service, or 
scanning), space (5.8GHz or 2.4GHz), antennas, and radio 
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power (50mW or 400mW).  Refer to Table 3 in Chapter III for  
the breakdown of the three and four-letter designator 
codes, such as AAII, found in column 1 of the following 
tables.  
 
MARCH 22, 2006 
 Radio Use Space Antennas Radio Power 
Root     
AAII Upstream 5.8 Unused 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 1 2.4 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 2 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 1     
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 2     
AAI Upstream 5.8 12dBi Large 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 12dBi Large 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 2     
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 3     
AAI Upstream 5.8 12dBi Small 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 12dBi Small 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 3     
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 4     
GGs Upstream 2.4 Cebrow panel 400mW 
 Downstream 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
 Scan 2.4 9dBi Super 400mW 
   










MARCH 23, 2006 
 Radio Use Space Antennas 
Radio 
Power 
Root     
AAII Upstream 5.8 Unused 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 1 2.4 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 2 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 1    
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 2     
AAI Upstream 5.8 12dBi Large 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 12dBi Large 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 2    
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 3     
AAI Upstream 5.8 12dBi Small 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 12dBi Small 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 3    
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 4     
GGs Upstream 2.4 Cebrow panel 400mW 
 Downstream 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
 Scan 2.4 9dBi Super 400mW 
 






MARCH 28, 2006 
 Radio Use Space Antennas 
Radio 
Power 
Root     
AAII Upstream 5.8 Unused 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 1 2.4 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
 Service 2 2.4 13dBi MP Sec 400mW 
Camera Node 1    
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 2     
AAI Upstream 5.8 super sectors 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 super sectors 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Balloon 1     
GGs Upstream 5.8 5dBi MP 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 5dBi MP 400mW 
 Scan 2.4 9dBi Super 400mW 
Camera Node 2    
AAI Upstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 3     
AAI Upstream 5.8 super sector 400mW 
 Downstream 5.8 nothing downstream 400mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
Camera Node 3    
AAI Upstream 5.8 
super sector 
spdn6f 50mW 
 Downstream 5.8 8dBi Super 50mW 
 Service 2.4 5dBi MP 50mW 
Node 4     
GGs Upstream 2.4 13dBi Sector 400mW 
 Downstream 2.4 5dBi MP 400mW 
 Scan 2.4 9dBi Super 400mW 
 
Table 14.   Mae Ngat Dam Ground Node Configurations for 
28MAR2006 
 
The original Mae Ngat Dam topology (Figure 40) 
provided for three aerial payloads with configurations 
similar to those used during the field experiments at Point 




Figure 40.   Intended Mae Ngat Dam 802.11 Topology 
 
However, due to logistic limitations, the COASTS 2006 team 
was unable to obtain enough helium in Thailand to support 
the operation of three balloons.  As a result, the Mae Ngat 
Dam network topology only included one aerial payload, 
depicted in Figure 41.  Below Table 15 breaks down the 
configuration of the aerial payload in the same manner that 
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Table 15.   Mae Ngat Dam Aerial Node Configurations 
 
 
Figure 41.   Aerial Payload Used at Mae Ngat Dam in March 
2006 
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5.  Field Tests 
The majority of the time spent during the March 
deployment to the Mae Ngat Dam was allocated to set up and 
test the integrated network topology.  The 802.11 network 
played a central role in the scenario/demonstration that is 
discussed in Appendix A-6 of the COASTS 2006 Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) (Appendix A).  All of the 802.11 
network assets that were mentioned in the COASTS 2006 
CONOPS were deployed with the exception of three aerial 
payloads.  
Due to the shortage of aerial payloads, the topology 
deployed at the Mae Ngat Dam was more rigorous because ten 
MeshDynamics 802.11 Mesh Modules were deployed.  The three 
main purposes of the aerial APs were  
• to extend the network into the air to serve as a 
gateway for other aerial clients, such as UAVs 
• to provide real-time streaming video of the 
demonstration area  
• to extend the network range for ground clients by 
providing an aerial AP with enhanced LOS.    
However, since only one aerial AP could be launched, seven 
Mesh Modules were deployed on the ground to augment the 
original four APs designed to service the entire dam area.  
The deployment of the ground network nodes on 30-foot light 
poles required the use of a bucket truck (Figure 42) to 
hoist a team member to the top of the light poles to 
install the ground nodes. 
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Figure 42.   Installation of Ground Nodes on light poles 
at Mae Ngat Dam  
 
Three of the ground nodes served as camera nodes in 
order to provide live streaming video back to the TOC, 
providing raw video data for display across the entire 
network, including both the 802.11 and 802.16 portions.   
The 802.11 tests that were performed at the Mae Ngat 








802.11 Test I – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 5dBi 
Determine the maximum range and throughput 
possible between access points that provide 
acceptable throughput using 5dBi omni antennae 
for backhaul  
802.11 Test II – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 13dbi and 5dBi 
Determine the maximum range and throughput 
possible between access points that provide 
acceptable throughput using 13 dBi and 5dBi 
omni antennas for backhaul  
802.11 Test III – 
Ground-to- Ground 
Range and Throughput 
w/ 13 dBi 
Determine the maximum range and throughput 
possible between access points that provide 
acceptable throughput using 13 dBi omni 
antennae for backhaul  
 
Table 16.   802.11 Field Tests Performed at the Mae Ngat Dam 
 
The most extensive field test performed was the 
scenario run-through and demonstration that took place on 
the final two days of testing.  All of the field experiment 
iterations that took place from December 2005 until March 
2006 were in preparation for this scenario.  During this 
scenario run-through and demonstration, the COASTS team 
successfully established a full wireless meshed network, 
including all aerial and ground nodes. 
6.  Results 
The field testing iteration at the Mae Ngat Dam proved 
to be very successful in terms of achieving the team’s 
objectives, as well as bringing to light some items that 
required future research.   
After successfully setting up a full 802.11 wireless 
meshed network at Fort Hunter Liggett, replicating that 
network on the Mae Ngat Dam face was highly important.  
Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of acquiring helium in 
Thailand, the COASTS team was only able to deploy one 
aerial payload.  However, this did not prevent the team 
from accomplishing the following tasks: 
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• Establishing an 802.11 structured mesh network 
along the Mae Ngat Dam face by securing the 
ground nodes to 30-foot light poles  
• Providing 802.11 client access to ground and air 
clients through the deployment of a single aerial 
payload 
• Providing real-time video surveillance of the 
entire area of operations through the use of up 
to six separate Axis 213 PZT wireless cameras, 
all operating on the network at one time (one 
aerial-deployed camera, five ground-deployed 
cameras) 
The ability of the network to support live video feeds 
from six cameras at one time demonstrated its robustness.  
The aerial-deployed camera provided surveillance coverage 
of the entire area of operations.  Each of the ground-
deployed camera nodes were strategically placed to provide 
surveillance of particular areas of interest around the 
operating area.  Some of the other highlights of the Mae 
Ngat Dam iteration were 
• Establishing a ground network that stretched 
approximately 1.2 miles and remained fairly 
constant in performance throughout the operating 
period 
• Communicating with two MeshDynamics Mesh Modules 
that were used to connect the Crossbow sensor 
network with the rest of the 802.11 meshed 
network.  These two nodes were located in a 
valley that was approximately one-hundred feet 
lower in elevation than the rest of the ground 
network. 
This is significant because it demonstrated that 
proper antenna alignment can overcome the difficulties in 
establishing connectivity among nodes that are located at 
different elevations.    
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Ultimately the success of the COASTS team at Mae Ngat 
Dam can be summarized by the screen shot shown in Figure 
43.  This image taken from MeshDynamics MeshViewer displays 
the full wireless meshed network that was deployed during 
the March deployment.  
 
 
Figure 43.   Screen Shot of Mae Ngat Dam 802.11 Network 
on MeshViewer  
 
This full 802.11 wireless meshed network surpassed all 
of the prior accomplishments of the COASTS 2005 and COASTS 
2006 teams and demonstrated the potential of the future 
COASTS program.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The research and field experimentation conducted over 
the past two years by the COASTS team has demonstrated the 
applicability of specific COTS wireless technologies.  
These technologies have been developed to enable an ad-hoc 
wireless meshed network that was used to support coalition 
operations taking place in adverse climatic environments.  
The lessons learned from the COASTS 2005 iteration allowed 
the COASTS 2006 team to make major advances in this network 
development.     
The main objective of this thesis was to research the 
overall effectiveness of the MeshDynamics 802.11 Mutliple-
Radio Mesh Modules as one of the key pieces of wireless 
technology by establishing a reliable, mobile, wireless 
network.  Several testing sessions occurred throughout the 
past year in order to prepare for the fully integrated 
network demonstration that took place in March and May 2006 
with the Royal Thai Armed Forces.   
Because the MeshDynamics Mesh Modules purchased by the 
COASTS 2006 team were different pieces of technology than 
the 802.11 wireless equipment used by the COASTS 2005 team, 
the initial tests done by this year’s team focused on 
finding the optimal antenna and radio configurations for 
the MeshDynamics Mesh Modules.  Throughout the testing 
iterations at Point Sur, Fort Ord, FHL, and the Mae Ngat 
Dam, the team was able to establish a solid wireless meshed 
network that supported various ISR assets, as well as, 
ground and aerial clients.  However, the performance of the 
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802.11 network was not 100 percent reliable.  There were a 
few instances throughout the network testing and 
integration sessions in which the network became 
unreliable.  Usually about once a day, the network’s 
throughput would suddenly degrade or one of the ground or 
aerial nodes would stop communicating with the rest of the 
wireless meshed network.  The reason for this was unclear.  
Often rebooting a node or slightly changing the direction 
in which an antenna was pointed reestablished network 
connectivity.  However, guaranteeing a consistent 
performance of the network was impossible. 
However, the overall performance of the 802.11 network 
exceeded the expectations of the COASTS 2006 team and did 
serve its purpose by supporting the network integration 
demonstration at the Mae Ngat Dam.  At this stage in its 
development, the COASTS team has developed a C4ISR 
infrastructure that, in addition to use by Maritime 
Security Forces, is also sufficient for use by law 
enforcement agencies and natural disaster recovery teams.  
The ability to set up an ad-hoc wireless network that 
provides communications, surveillance, and overall 
situational awareness capabilities is essential.  However, 
there is still room for improvement in terms of overall 
network reliability.    
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
The new 802.11 technologies used by this year’s team 
brought to light many new lessons learned.  The primary 
issues that required attention were antenna alignment and 
radio configuration.  The antennas that were used on each 
node were chosen based on the location and purpose of the 
node.  For example, the best antenna to use on the root 
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node was determined to be the 13 dBi directional antenna.  
The signal radiated from these antennas allowed the root 
node, which was located at the TOC, to communicate directly 
with the fourth ground node.  Another lesson learned was 
the importance of elevation effects and LOS between the 
MeshDynamics Mesh Modules.  The performance of the network 
will degrade significantly if changes in elevation are not 
accounted for with proper antenna alignment.  At Fort Ord, 
the COASTS team made use of directional antennas to 
overcome the lack of LOS and the change in elevation 
between the four ground nodes.   
In regard to the set-up of the 802.11 network, there 
were lessons learned that will make the future network set-
up even more efficient.  Because each of the MeshDynamics 
Mesh Modules have similar outer casings, placing a tag on 
each module that identifies the radios that they are 
configured with is important.  Labeling the boxes will end 
the need to open each mesh module in order to check its 
configurations.  Another important lesson learned was to 
test each aerial payload before attaching it to the 
balloons and raising them to the desired elevation.  This 
can be done by powering up the aerial payload, and standing 
about fifty feet in front of the root node, and waiting for 
it to initially connect to the wireless meshed network.    
Another important lesson learned was in regard to wind 
direction affecting the position of the balloons and aerial 
nodes.  The antennas on the root node are pointed in the 
direction of the other ground nodes.  The position of the 
aerial nodes is also within the coverage area of the root 
node’s antennas.  However, there have been instances in 
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which the direction of the wind has shifted the balloons 
and aerial payloads out of the coverage area of the root 
node’s antennas, resulting in a loss of communication 
between the ground network and the aerial nodes. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The success of the COASTS 2006 team has opened the 
door for future research that will benefit not only future 
COASTS project teams, but also the United States, Thai, and 
other potential coalition military forces.  In particular, 
the recently formed U.S. Navy’s NECC and its new Riverine 
Warfare group, which will become operational in January 
2007, may be able to start using some of the technologies 
that have been tested by the COASTS 2006 team.  The first 
mission for the U.S. Navy’s Riverine Group One will be the 
surveillance and protection of the Haditha Dam, located on 
the Euphrates River in Iraq.  The C4ISR infrastructure that 
was designed for and established at Thailand’s Mae Ngat Dam 
by the COASTS team may serve as an excellent starting point 
for future C4ISR infrastructures that can be used by U.S. 
Riverine Forces at imminent deployment locations in Iraq 
and elsewhere.     
With the success of the COASTS 2006 team working in 
conjunction with the Royal Thai military forces, the COASTS 
2007 iteration will once again take place at the Mae Ngat 
Dam in Thailand.  Returning to the same location for next 
year’s project will be a major advantage to the COASTS 2007 
team.  The procedure for network set-up, most importantly 
the placement of ground and aerial nodes, has already been 
established.   
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One of the major focal points for next year’s team 
will be to find an optimal antenna and radio configuration 
for the MeshDynamics 802.11 Mesh Modules, which will be 
placed on the aerial payloads.  Achieving reliable 
communications between the ground and air portions of the 
network is a major objective of both the COASTS team and 
its Royal Thai Military Forces partners.  The aerial nodes 
serve as the primary platform for providing streaming video 
surveillance of the area of operations. One of the major 
problems faced during the field tests by this year’s team 
was the inconsistency of the aerial payloads to provide 
live streaming video.  The factors that caused this problem 
are not presently known.  Whether it was degraded 
performance of the MD Mesh Modules, or the Axis cameras is 
still in question.   
The design of the aerial payloads for this year’s 
field tests proved to be sufficient in terms of being 
structurally sound.  However, the weight of the payloads 
often came close to the lift capacity of the balloons being 
used by the COASTS team.  During periods of high humidity 
or heavy winds, the balloon’s lift capacity was reduced and 
the aerial payload could not be raised to the desired 
elevation.  Part of the problem was the need to power the 
MeshDynamics Mesh Module and the Axis 213 PZT camera from 
two different battery packs.  Powering the aerial cameras 
from the same power source used for the MD Mesh Modules 
allowed for a smaller logistical footprint, as well as, a 
lighter payload.  Another reason for a lighter payload was 
to provide the option of adding GPS and weather kestrel 
units to each payload. 
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Another area in which future research should be 
focused is on the effects of weather and environmental 
conditions on the performance of the network, in particular 
the MeshDynamics 802.11 Mutliple-Radio Mesh Modules.  
Limited amounts of weather data were collected throughout 
the course of the COASTS 2006 field tests.  The 
MeshDynamics Mesh Modules were used in a variety of weather 
conditions; however, no conclusive data exist as to how the 
various conditions affected the overall performance of the 
mesh modules.     
In conclusion, the continued success with the Royal 
Thai Armed Forces and the formation of the U.S. Navy’s 
Riverine Forces has opened the way for continued research 
that can support the various missions of these 
organizations.  The resulting success of the COASTS 2006 
team, and the head start that the COASTS 2007 team has for 
next year’s network integration testing, is bound to result 
in a C4ISR architecture that facilitates the rapid 
dissemination of crucial information, as well as, a 
communication platform that provides multiple situational 
awareness capabilities in one package.  This in turn will 
decrease the chances of operational failure due to lack of 
information and will result in increased mission success. 
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MDP-RG Maritime Domain Protection Research Group 
MDS Mercury Data Systems 
MIO Maritime Interdiction Operation 
MOE  Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP  Measures of Performance 
MOSP Multi-Mission Optronic Stabilized Payload 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSW Naval Special Warfare 
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OTH Over the Horizon 
OTHT Over the Horizon Targeting 
PDA Personal Data Assistant 
PSYOP Psychological Operations  
RF Radio Frequency 
RHIB Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
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ROE Rules of Engagement 
RTA Royal Thai Army 
RTAF Royal Thai Air Force 
RTARF Royal Thai Armed Forces 
RTN Royal Thai Navy 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SBU Special Boat Units 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SSA Shared Situational Awareness 
SSA Shan State Army 
SURA Shan United Revolutionary Army 
TNT FE Tactical Network Topology Field Experiment 
TTS Text to Speech   
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USA United States Army 
USAF United States Air Force 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USG United States Government 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
UWSA United Wa State Army 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime 
VBSS Visit, Board, Search, & Seizure 
VA Voice Authentication 
VOIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
VLV Variable Length Verification 
VM Verification Model 
VUI Voice User Interface 
VV Voice Verification  
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Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity 
Wi-Max Wireless  
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network 
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1.0 PURPOSE 
This document describes the FY2006 Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) for the development and implementation of the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) research program entitled 
the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and Targeting 
System (COASTS).  The COASTS field experimentation program 
supports U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Joint Interagency 
Task Force West (JIATF-W), Joint U.S. Military Advisory 
Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM), NPS, Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), 
and the Thai Department of Research & Development Office 
(DRDO) science and technology research requirements 
relating to theater and national security, counter-drug and 
law enforcement missions, and the War On Terror (WOT).  
This CONOPS is primarily intended for use by the NPS and 
RTARF management teams as well as by participating 
commercial partners.  However, it may be provided to other 
U.S. Government (USG) organizations as applicable.  This 
document describes research and development aspects of the 
COASTS program and establishes a proposed timetable for a 
cap-stone demonstration during May 2006 in Thailand. 
 
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION: Distribution limited to the 
Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. DoD contractors, and to 
U.S. Government Agencies supporting DoD functions, and is 
made under the authority of the Director, DMA.  Foreign 
governments, contractors, and military personnel 
contributing to the COASTS research project are included 
within the limited distribution per the purview of the 
COASTS Program Manager.  
 
1.1. BACKGROUND. 
The COASTS programmatic concept is modeled after a very 
successful ongoing NPS-driven field experimentation program 
entitled the NPS-U.S. Special Operations Command Field 
Experimentation Program (NPSSOCFEP).  NPSSOCFEP is executed 
by NPS, in cooperation with USSOCOM and several 
contractors, and has been active since FY2002.  Program 
inception supported USSOCOM requirements for integrating 
emerging wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies 
with surveillance and targeting hardware/software systems 
to augment Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions.  
NPSSOCFEP has grown significantly since inauguration to 
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include 10-12 private sector companies who continue to 
demonstrate their hardware/software capabilities, several 
DoD organizations (led by NPS) who provide operational and 
tactical surveillance and targeting requirements, as well 
as other academic institutions and universities who 
contribute a variety of resources.  
 
1.1.1  NPSSOCFEP Specifics. 
NPSSOCFEP conducts quarterly 1-2 week long complex 
experiments comprising 8-10 NPS faculty members, 20-30 NPS 
students, and representatives from multiple private 
companies, DoD and US government agencies. Major objectives 
are as follows: 
 
- Provide an opportunity for NPS students and faculty to 
experiment/evaluate with the latest technologies which have 
potential near-term application to the warfighter. 
- Leverage operational experience of NPS students and 
faculty 
- Provide military, national laboratories, contractors, and 
civilian universities an opportunity to test and evaluate 
new technologies in operational environments 
- Utilize small, focused field experiments with well-
defined measures of performance for both the technologies 
and the operator using the technologies 
- Implement self-forming / self-healing, multi-path, ad-hoc 
network w/sensor cell, ground, air, and satellite 
communications (SATCOM) network components  
 
1.1.2  NPSSOCFEP Limitations. 
1.1.2.1 Sensitivities with Foreign 
Observers/Participants. 
Certain hardware, software, and 
tactics/techniques/procedures (TTP’s) implemented at 
NPSSOCFEP are classified or operationally sensitive, and as 
a result sponsors have not agreed to foreign military 
partnerships.  However, DoD requirements exist for U.S. 
military forces to operate in coalition environments (which 
serve to strengthen relationships with foreign military 
partners) and to execute missions globally.  Since 
NPSSOCFEP remains primarily a US-only event, COASTS was 
designed to address coalition inter-operability exchange 
and cooperative R&D.  
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1.1.2.2 Meteorological, Hydrographic, & Geographic 
Considerations. 
The majority of wireless network topology 
research conducted by the NPS has occurred in the 
California Central Coast area where vegetation and climate 
is not representative of the Pacific Area of Responsibility 
(AOR)—a likely deployment location for tactical or 
operational WLAN and surveillance/targeting technologies.   
Higher temperatures and humidity, as well as denser 
vegetation in regions like Southeast Asia will likely 
create WLAN and sensor performance problems. This was 
proven in data collected during the COASTS 2005 deployment, 
and will be further examined in the 2006 deployment.  
 
1.1.3  COASTS 2005. 
1.1.3.1  Purpose. 
COASTS 2005 leveraged and integrated the 
technological expertise of NPS’s education and research 
resources with the science and technology and operational 
requirements of the RTARF.  This was done using WLAN 
technologies (see Figure 1 next page) to fuse and display 
information from air and ground sensors to a real-time, 
tactical, coalition enabled command and control (C2) 
center. The additional benefit of this first COASTS field 
experiment was to demonstrate USPACOM commitment to foster 
stronger multi-lateral relations in the area of technology 
development and coalition warfare with key Pacific AOR 
allies in the WOT - results from the May 2005 demonstration 
were provided to representatives from Thailand, Singapore, 






Figure 1.   COASTS 2005 Network Topology 
 
1.1.4.  COASTS 2006. 
1.1.4.1  Purpose. 
COASTS 2006 will expand upon the original field 
experiment conducted during last year’s deployment to Wing 
2, Lop Buri, Thailand. This year’s network topology (see 
Figures 2 and 3 on following pages) will advance research 
relative to low-cost, commercially available solutions 
while integrating each technology/capability into a larger 
system of systems in support of tactical action scenarios.  
The demonstration planned for May 2006 is an air, ground, 
and water-based scenario (details provided below), 
occurring just north of Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The scenario 
encompasses first-responder, law enforcement, counter-
terrorism, and counter-drug objectives.   The tactical 
information being collected from the scenario will be 
fused, displayed, and distributed in real-time to local 
(Chiang Mai), theater (Bangkok), and global (Alameda, 
California) C2 centers. This fusion of information leads to 
the validation of using wireless communication mediums to 
support redundant links of the National Information 
Infrastructure, as well as to test and evaluate the ‘last 
mile’ solution for the disadvantaged user.  Continuing with 
last year’s research theme, COASTS 2006 will again: (1) 
examine the feasibility of rapidly-deploying networks, 
called “Fly-away Kits” (FLAK) and (2) explore sustainment 
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considerations with respect to a hostile climatic 
(temperature, humidity, wind, etc.) environment.  Network 
improvements will include the testing and evaluation of new 
802.11 mesh LAN equipment, the refinement of a jointly-
developed (NPS and Mercury Data Systems) 3-D topographic 
shared situational awareness (SSA) application called 
C3Trak, the integration of “satellite in a suitcase” 
(portable satellite communication equipment) technology, 
enhanced unattended ground and water-based sensors, new 
balloon and UAV designs, portable biometric devices, 
portable explosive residue detecting devices, and revised 
operational procedures for deployment of the network. 
Further explanation of the network technology can be found 








Figure 3.   COASTS 2006 Global Network Topology 
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1.3  SCOPE. 
This concept of operations (CONOPS) applies to all aspects 
of the COASTS project from date of issue through the May 
2006 Thailand-based demonstration.  This document is 
intended to provide critical information regarding the 
planning and execution of all aspects of the FY2006 field 
experimentation program.  Additionally, this CONOPS 
provides a technical and tactical framework for complex 
system demonstrations used in coalition environments. This 
document will cover the use of COASTS as a stand-alone or 
networked capability focused on security mission profiles 
that can be enhanced by the employment of COASTS 
technologies. 
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2.0  OVERVIEW. 
2.1  CURRENT SITUATION.   
2.1.1  U.S. Perspective. 
The risk of asymmetric threats to U.S. national security 
has outpaced the danger of traditional combat operations 
against a first-tier opposing military force. National 
security requirements are increasingly focused on facing 
non-military, non-traditional, asymmetric threats: piracy, 
terrorism, narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, weapons 
of mass destruction, and other transnational threats. 
Furthermore, with the always accelerating movement of 
globalization stretching U.S. interests further away from 
domestic borders, the national security issues of allies 
and other friendly nations are as vital to the U.S. as 
American domestic security issues.  
 
Last year in Sacramento, California over 73,000 “Yaa Baa” 
(crazy medicine) methamphetamine pills were confiscated by 
law enforcement. Yaa baa is produced primarily by the 
United WA State Army (UWSA), an ethnic insurgency force 
operating within the Burmese portion of the Golden Triangle 
region of Southeast Asia. These drugs were cultivated in 
the Golden Triangle, passed across the borders of multiple 
nations in Southeast Asia, and across the Pacific Ocean 
through various other international harbors such as Hong 
Kong or Singapore, as well as at least one domestic U.S. 
harbor. As easily as these drugs move into the interior of 
America, so could any multitude of other national security 
threats such as chemical and biological weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
Numerous law enforcement, corporate and bi-lateral, 
multilateral, and international governmental initiatives 
are attempting to address these security issues on a 
variety of levels. JIATF-W is constructing 
data/intelligence fusion centers like the Inter-agency 
Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) in Chiang Mai, Thailand 
to enable joint and coalition intelligence collection for 
combined multi-national operations. The Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI) and Cooperative Maritime 
Agreement (CMA) Advanced Technology Concept Demonstration 
(ATCD), focus on transnational open ocean counter-piracy 
and counter-terrorism, and investigate the formulation of 
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more intelligence fusion centers and multilateral coastal 
patrolling agreements, i.e. MALSINDO respective to the 
Straits of Malacca.  
    
The importance of a coalition-oriented focus for modern 
Maritime Domain Awareness and Protection operations is not 
lost on U.S. combatant commanders. In a recent naval 
message, all numbered fleet commanders stated their number 
one Command, Control, Computers, Communications, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
requirement is improved coalition communications. Current 
and future operational capabilities are tightly tied to 
improved interoperability with U.S. allies in the 
operational theater. As reflected by the increasing number 
of requests to NPS from foreign partners, there is an 
immediate requirement for low-cost, state-of-the-art, real-
time threat warning and tactical communication equipment 
that is also rapidly scaleable based on operational 
considerations. This issue has become especially apparent 
in the face of the overwhelming mission requirements placed 
on US forces conducting the WOT. 
 
The WOT extends globally where nations are engaged in 
direct action against numerous forces employing asymmetric 
tactics. In Thailand, the separatist insurgency in the 
southern provinces is connected to various transnational 
terrorist organizations which have struck against both the 
U.S. and its allies, to include both the Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) and Al-Qaeda.  
 
Further exacerbating the above situation, most current 
tactical systems lack the capability to rapidly enable a 
common information environment (CIE) amongst air, surface, 
and sub-surface entities via a self-forming, self-
authenticating, autonomous network.  Although commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies exist that can satisfy 
some of these requirements, these same technologies 
typically do not meet all of the DoD and coalition partner 
requirements associated with WOT and other security 
missions.   Hence a central role of the COASTS field 
experimentation program is to demonstrate that NPS, in 
conjunction with coalition partner R&D organizations, can 
integrate COTS capabilities into a larger system of systems 




2.1.2  Thailand Perspective. 
 
The Golden Triangle Region of Southeast Asia, which 
includes the border regions of Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and 
China, cultivates, produces, and ships enough opium and 
heroin to be second only to Afghanistan as a global 
production region. Furthermore, the Western portion of the 
Golden Triangle, located along most of the Burmese border 
with Thailand, is the largest yaa baa methamphetamine 
producing region in the world. Over one million addicts of 
yaa baa currently reside in Thailand.      
 
2.1.2.1  Burma 
Burma remains the world’s second largest producer 
of illicit opium with an estimated production of 292 metric 
tons in 2004.  It is estimated that less than 1% of Burma's 
annual opium production is intercepted - the rest is 
smuggled out through China or Thailand onto the world 
market. Perhaps more significant, Burma and the Golden 
Triangle is the largest methamphetamine-producing region in 
the world.  A 1999 survey of 32 of Thailand’s 76 provinces 
showed that nearly 55 percent of youths in secondary and 
tertiary education were using methamphetamines.  Not 
surprisingly, Thailand views the opium and methamphetamine 
production of the Golden Triangle as a threat to national 
security and is eager to stem the flow of these drugs 
across its national borders. 
 
2.1.2.2  The United Wa State Army (UWSA). 
The remote jungles that divide Burma and Thailand 
are controlled by the UWSA, a powerful militant 
organization comprised from the Wa ethnic group.  They have 
a historic reputation as a savage people; in fact some 
tribes practiced headhunting as late as the 1970’s.  The 
Wa, serving as the primary fighting force of the Burmese 
Communist Party (BCP) until the BCP’s disintegration in 
1988, took over the BCP’s drug operations and expanded upon 
them. The UWSA is, a well-equipped military force of 
approximately 20,000 soldiers, and is the largest drug-
producing and trafficking group in Southeast Asia, 
producing heroin, methamphetamine, and possibly 
Methylenedioxy Methamphetamine (MDMA), or “Ecstasy”.. The 
UWSA buys opium from the Kokang Chinese, the Shan United 
Revolutionary Army (SURA), and others to use in their 
increasing number of refineries – currently estimated at 
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more than 50. The Southern Military Region of the UWSA is 
located in the Mong Yawn Valley near the Burma–Thailand 
border.  Involved in the drug trade for decades, the Wa has 
increasingly switched to the production of methamphetamine 
pills due to international pressure to cut opium 
production. Due to increasing friction between the UWSA and 
the Burmese government - because of law enforcement efforts 
and greater power sought by regional Communists - there has 
been a significant increase of violence and traffic across 
the Thai border.  As a result, a coalition effort 
consisting of Thai and U.S. forces was created in the 
Burma-Thailand border area of the Golden Triangle. 
 
2.1.2.3. Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA). 
Competing with the Wa in the drug smuggling 
activity is the Shan ethnic group in cooperation with the 
Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA).  The SURA contains 
approximately 1,500 ethnic Shan soldiers and is one of the 
few remaining ethnic insurgent groups that have not agreed 
to a cease-fire arrangement with the Burmese Government. 
Recent reporting indicates that the SURA is collecting 
taxes from Shan traffickers and is forcing farmers to grow 
opium.  Due to hostilities with the Wa in Burma, over 
200,000 Shan refugees have crossed into Thailand since 2000 
where most end up as illegal laborers. 
 
2.1.3  U.S. and Thai Partnership. 
It is the intent of the COASTS field experimentation 
program to demonstrate TTPs that: (1) potentially reduce or 
mitigate drug trafficking across the Thai-Burma border, (2) 
provide actionable information (real-time) to  local, 
regional, and strategic level decision-makers, and (3) 
shorten the sensor-to-shooter cycle.     
 
2.2  SYSTEM SUMMARY.    
COASTS is an individual and small unit network-capable 
communication and threat warning system using an open, 
plug-and-play architecture, which is user-configurable, 
employing air balloons, wireless ad-hoc networks, UAVs, SSA 
software applications, biometrics capabilities, portable 
and fixed ground and water based integrated sensors, and 
personnel equipped with Tacticomp/Antelope or similar PDAs, 
all communicating via wireless network technology. 
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2.3  CAPABILITIES.    
COASTS 2006 provides a mobile field experiment bed 
environment for U.S. and Thailand in support of R&D, 
integration, operational testing, and field validation of 
several emerging wireless technologies and equipment 
suites.  The following research elements will be addressed: 
• 802.11 b Distributed Sequence Spread Spectrum 
(DSSS) 
• 802.11a/g Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM) 
• 802.16 OFDM (Stationary) 
• 802.16 OFDM (Mobile) 
• SATCOM 
• Situational Awareness Overlay Software 
• Wearable Computing Devices 
• Air, Ground, and Water Integrated Sensors 
• Mobile C2 Platforms 
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (Fixed wing) 
• UAVs (Rotary wing) 
• Unmanned Multi-environment micro vehicles  
• Ultra-wide Band Integrated Sensors 
• Deny-GPS Inertial Gyro technology  
• Network Security Applications 
• Compression software applications 
• Biometrics applications 
   
2.4  MAJOR COMPONENTS.    
While the final configuration of the COASTS 2006 system may 
evolve further, the following core elements represent the 
major system components:  
 
• Supplied by Thailand: 
• Chiang Mai IIFC 
• Lighter-than-air Vehicle (LTAV) 
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• L-39 Fighters (2) 
• Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) 
• Mobile Command Platform (MCP) – Figure 4  
• Wing 41 facilities 
• AU-23 configured with 802.11g connectivity 
• Royal Thai Army (RTA) interdiction squad 
 
 
Figure 4.   Thai Mobile Command Platform 
 
• Supplied by NPS: 
• Situational awareness common operating 
picture (SA COP) systems 
• Tethered balloons and associated hardware – 
Figure 5  
• Airborne camera system for balloon and/or 
UAVs – Figure 6  
• Wearable Computing Devices (INTER-4 
Tacticomp) – Figure 7 
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• Three (3) laptops for use in the NMC 
• Three (3) Modular PCs (Antelope) 
• 802.11a/b/g network devices – Figure 8 
• 802.16 OFDM network devices – Figure 9 
• Deny GPS  
• Rotomotion UAV – Figure 10 
• CyberDefense UAV – Figure 11 
• Helia-Kite Network Extender – Figure 12 
• Network Security Applications 
• Small boat FLAKs 
• Biometric devices – Figure 13 









Figure 6.   Airborne camera system for balloon and/or UAVs 
 
 
Figure 7.   INTER-4 Tacticomp Handheld GPS Enabled 




Figure 8.   802.11a/b/g network Mesh Dynamics Unit 
 
 
Figure 9.   Red Line Communications 802.16 Suite 
 
 




Figure 11.   Cyber Defense UAV 
 
 
Figure 12.   Helia-Kite Network Extender 
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Figure 13.   Biometric Collection Device 
 
 
Figure 14.   Morphing Micro Air-Land Vehicle (MMALV) 
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2.5  CONFIGURATIONS. 
 
The May 2006 COASTS demonstration will have four basic 
configurations: (1) a command, control, collection, and 
communication suite; (2) a threat warning system; (3) an 
intelligence collection system; and (4) a Global Law 
Enforcement Interdiction database. 
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3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 
3.1 USERS. 
Generally, the COASTS 2006 participants will focus on 
creating an international interaction mechanism for U.S. 
military forces, to include NPS, to collaborate with 
Thailand research & development organizations and military 
forces to support WOT objectives and internal/external Thai 
security requirements.   
 
The primary users during the May 2006 demonstration will be 
the military and civilian NPS students and faculty, JIATF-W 
personnel, JUSMAGTHAI personnel, and various units from the 
RTARF.  Secondary users may include members of the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Japanese Self Defense Force 
(JSDF), Republic of the Philippines Army, and the 
Australian Army. Tertiary users will be the various vendors 
providing equipment and technical expertise to include 
Cisco Systems Inc., Redline Communications, Mercury Data 
Systems, CyberDefense Systems, Roto-motion Inc, Identix, 
and INTER-4. Specific vendor contributions shall be 
discussed in the Appendix section of this document.  The 
NPS, RTARF, and vendor team will integrate COASTS into a 
system to facilitate surveillance and monitoring of 
simulated “areas of interest”. 
 
3.2 COASTS SUPPORT FOR PRINCIPAL MISSION AREAS. 
As per Joint Doctrine, COASTS will directly support 
organizing, training, and equipping U.S. military forces 
and the RTARF in nine principal mission areas: 
 
Direct Action (DA):  The primary function of COASTS during 
DA missions is to provide Force Protection. DA missions are 
typically short-duration, offensive, high-tempo operations 
that require real-time threat information presented with 
little or no operator interface.  COASTS will augment other 
capabilities in direct support of DA from an over-watch 
position.  COASTS in support of DA will target collection 
to support threat warnings relevant to that specific 
operation and provide automated reporting to the Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC) for potential threats relevant to a 
specific mission.  COASTS may also be used as the primary 
source of threat information in the absence of other 
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capabilities.  Threat information presented by COASTS is 
intended to be relevant, real-time or near real-time, and 
within the area of operation. 
 
Tactical Reconnaissance (TR): The primary purpose of a TR 
mission is to collect information.  COASTS will augment 
other capabilities to obtain or verify information 
concerning the capabilities, intentions, locations, and 
activities of an actual or potential adversary.  COASTS 
will support the full range of information and 
communication functions.  COASTS will support operators 
with the rapid collection, processing, analysis, and 
dissemination of information.  COASTS will analyze how 
performance in this mission is influenced by 
meteorological, hydrographic, and geographic 
considerations. 
 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID):  COASTS will assist Host 
Nation (HN) military and paramilitary forces, with the goal 
to enable these forces to maintain the HN’s internal 
stability. 
 
Combating Terrorism (CBT):  COASTS will support CBT 
activities, to include anti-terrorism (defensive measures 
taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and 
counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, 
deter, and respond to terrorism), conducted to oppose 
terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.   
 
Civil Affairs (CA):  COASTS will assist CA activities in 
peacetime to preclude grievances from flaring into war and 
during hostilities to help ensure that civilians do not 
interfere with operations and that they are protected and 
cared for in the combat zone. 
 
Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):  
COASTS will assist traditional capabilities to seize, 
capture, destroy, render safe, or recover WMD.  COASTS can 
provide information to assist U.S. military forces and 
coalition partners to operate against threats posed by WMD 
and their delivery systems. 
 
Information Operations (IO):  COASTS can augment actions 
taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one’s own information and 
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information systems.  IO applies across all phases of an 
operation and the spectrum of military operations. 
 
Counter-narcotic Operations: COASTS will augment JIATF-W, 
U.S. Embassy Bangkok, and Thai law enforcement efforts to 
reduce the level of transnational narcotic smuggling across 
international borders in Southeast Asia. Since the “Golden 
Triangle” region is the second largest producer of the 
world market’s heroin and methamphetamines, this regional 
reduction will further contribute to worldwide counter-drug 
efforts.  
 
Maritime Security: COASTS will utilize a C4ISR capability 
for small boats that can be used for connectivity between 
any small boat assets capable of conducting maritime 
terrorism interdiction operations. The modular usage of 
FLAK technology makes small boat interdictions ISR-mission 
capable. Junk Force, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), United States 
Navy (USN), Small Boat Unit (SBU), Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW), Special Operations Force (SOF), etc. will all 
potentially benefit from the COASTS 2006 research field 
experiment.  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operation/Leadership Interdiction 
Operation (MIO/LIO):  Visit Board, Search, and Seizure 
(VBSS) operations are conducted by all U.S. and coalition 
forces, to include various law enforcement agencies. 
Various network topologies tested in COASTS will enhance 
the C4ISR capabilities of conducting these operations. 
Historically, these missions have been removed from the 
digital divide of wireless capabilities for operations, and 
will be a focus point in COASTS 2006.  
 
Training: The demonstration will be conducted in 
coordination with the US military forces, Thailand law 
enforcement academies, and various Thai military 
communications divisions. The technical and doctrinal 
information-sharing will contribute to the coalition 
operational capability of the Thai and U.S. civilian-
military forces.  
 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP): As a vital IO tool in 
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, the 
COASTS network will analyze the ability of the COASTS 
network to be used for PSYOP missions in the tactical 
environment.   
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3.2.1 Thailand Requirements. 
3.2.1.1 Thailand Requirement Overview.   
Thailand has a 2100 kilometer border with Burma 
that requires its military assets to patrol, as well as to 
provide surveillance, monitoring and targeting to combat 
drug smugglers and human traffickers from entering the 
country via Burma.  This illicit drug smuggling/human 
trafficking problem is significant for both Thailand and 
the U.S. as these activities may potentially support 
financing and operations of international terrorist 
organizations.   
 
In addition, some of the illegal drugs that 
successfully evade Thailand’s security infrastructure are 
ultimately taken to the U.S. via containerized shipping 
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits.  The 
RTAF has been assigned the responsibility of aerial patrols 
of the Thailand/Burma border areas while the Royal Thai 
Army (RTA) 3rd Army maintains cognizance for ground–based 
security and surveillance. 
 
Likewise, the recent difficulties in the southern 
regions of Thailand pose potential serious security 
concerns.  In an attempt to de-escalate tensions RTARF 
assets, most specifically the RTA 4th Army, have been 
deployed to the region.  Continued difficulty, or an 
escalation in unrest, might lead to instability along the 
border as well as impacting the stability postures of other 
nations within the region. 
 
The insurgency in the Southern Provinces has 
greatly affected Thailand’s national security. Consistent 
asymmetric attacks from insurgents have taken a significant 
toll on the Thailand military forces. Increasing both 
ground and maritime security through more capable ISR will 
enable Thailand to reduce asymmetric attacks against 
civilian and military targets.  
 
Finally, Thailand has been engaged in efforts, 
primarily in the Gulf of Thailand and surrounding 
territorial waters, to mitigate small boat activity 





3.2.1.2 COASTS Support to Thai Requirements.   
The RTARF has previously approached NPS for 
collaboration using UAVs and related surveillance/targeting 
technologies to augment their land and maritime border 
patrolling resources.  The RTARF is considering using UAV’s 
and sensor meshes to help control their northern and 
southern borders.   
 
3.3 COASTS IMPLEMENTATION AND OBJECTIVES – PHASED 
APPROACH. 
The overall COASTS program uses a phased spiral development 
to implement the Thailand-based demonstration.  
  
Phase I:  This initial phase will consist of the integrated 
demonstration (Test I) at Point Sur, California from 5-9 
December, 2005. The NPS COASTS team will use the Point Sur 
test as a reduced-scale baseline in support of the 
deployable COASTS network.  
 
Phase II:  Following the 2005-2006 holiday break, the 
COASTS Program Manager will attend a mid-planning 
conference with the Thai leadership in Bangkok and Chiang 
Mai, Thailand on January 23-27, 2006.  In addition, the 
802.16 Wi-max link between the Joint Operations Area (Mae 
Ngat Dam) and the IIFC will be constructed and tested. 
Based on the information and decisions derived from this 
conference, a second integrated test (Test II) will be 
conducted at Point Sur on February 6-10, 2006. Equipment, 
network, and scenario implementation decisions will be 
finalized at the conclusion of Test II. The final planning 
conference will be conducted on February 20-24, 2006 in 
Bangkok, Thailand.  
 
Phase III: The third phase will commence with the complete 
COASTS system deployment from NPS to Thailand, and 
subsequent set-up and testing, occurring in late March 2006 
(exact dates are TBD, but are expected to be March 20-31, 
2006).  The primary focus of this phase will be to identify 
and mitigate any shortfalls relating to administration, 
deployment, and operation of the COASTS network. Upon 
completion of successful testing and operation, the COASTS 
network will be disassembled and stored at JUSMAGTHAI 
and/or Wing 41. 
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Phase IV:  This fourth and final phase will consist of the 
actual operational demonstration, occurring May 22-31 2006.  
Since the timing of the COASTS demonstration is in parallel 
with the COBRA GOLD 2006 Command Post Exercise (CPX), COBRA 
GOLD and senior RTARF leadership will be available to 
receive the COASTS executive summary and observe the actual 
system demonstration. 
 
3.3.1 Phase I - Work Up.   
Phase I consists of the following. 
 
Milestones Completed:   
 
• Conducted a July 2005 After Action Report (AAR) 
debrief for U.S. and Thai COASTS 2005 
participants, to include full disclosure on all 
pertinent issues concerning the deployment and 
demonstration testing.   
• Conducted an August 2005 site survey that 
included Wing 41, the Mae Ngat Dam Joint 
Operations Area (JOA), and the IIFC. Baseline 
signal readings were taken at the Mae Ngat Dam as 
well as GPS positions for future network asset 
placements. 
• Completed an October 2005 concept development 
conference at the NPS with RTARF officers. 
 
Major Issues Remaining: 
 
• Operational and Technical details of the LTAV? 
• Cross-channel interference from the RTAF 802.11g 
capability?  
• Availability of the MCP? 
• Power at the Mae Ngat Dam? 
• Lack of thesis students for key 
operational/technical areas? 
• GPS positions of cell-phone towers in Chang Mai, 
Thailand? 
• Baseline tests during the Pt Sur Integrated 
tests? 
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• Secondary tests during the second Pt Sur 
Integrated tests? 
• Mini-test schedules and locations 
• MIFC VPN planning meeting 
• Biometric planning meeting 
• NSG Monterey training & operational schedule 
 
3.3.2 Phase II – Pt Sur Integrated Test I & II 
Phase II entails the collection of individual nodal and 
integrated tests required to prepare for the COASTS 
deployment to Thailand in March and May 2006. On December 
3-9, 2005, COASTS members conducted the first integrated 
test of equipment at PT Sur California. These tests 
included: 
• Initial Network Construction 
• 802.11 antenna configuration, range, and power 
testing 
• Deny GPS testing 
• Baseline Data Collection 
• Initial Logistics management 
• Mobile and Stationary 802.16 OFDM testing 
 
Overall, the completed tests identified further research 
avenues, equipment requirements, and logistics needs the 
team must assess prior to the deployment to Thailand in 
March 2006.  
 
Over the Holiday break, individual node leaders will 
conduct tests to finalize their baseline testing parameters 
prior to the second and third integrated tests. These mini-
tests will focus on antenna configuration, power 
management, and the removal of extraneous material prior to 
deployment. The first integrated tests to follow these will 
be conducted at the former Fort Ord North of the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. The next integrated 





3.3.3 Phase III – Movement to Site 
Phase III continues the planning and preparation for the 
May 2006 demonstration to include movement of personnel and 
equipment to on-site Thailand locations designated for the 
demonstration.  Further, on site testing will be 
accomplished during Phase III prior to beginning Phase IV 
preparations. The March 2006 deployment, tentatively 
scheduled for 20-24 March 2006, will include 
transportation, network set-up, and initial baseline 
testing for the full demonstration.  
 
3.3.4 Phase IV – May 2006 Demonstration.   
The actual COASTS project demonstration will attempt to 
prove a low-cost, state of the art, rapidly deployable, 
scalable tactical system to monitor a land/sea border 
region using unattended air and ground sensors connected 
through an assortment of wireless network technologies 





Figure 15.      COASTS Demonstration Configuration 
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3.3.4.1 802.11 (2.4 GHz) End-user Tactical 
Network. 
This local area network will be comprised of an 
802.11g footprint established via MeshDynamic access points 
(MD-300) located aloft on four balloons as well as placed 
at various ground stations to provide system and network 
redundancy.  This network facilitates the situational 
agents end nodes and will connect to a local Mobile Command 
Platform (MCP) – a Royal Thai Army supplied 10-ton truck 
equipped with a variety of communications equipment co-
located with air assets at the Mae Ngat Dam. 
 
3.3.4.2 802.16 OFDM (5.0 GHz) Backbone. 
Four 802.16 OFDM point-to-point suites will be 
established in order to construct the backbone links from 
the origination point at the Mae Ngat Dam to the IIFC in 
Chiang Mai. Three hops will be required which will be 
accomplished through the mounting of 802.16 suites on 
cellular towers operated by the AIS Company of Thailand.  
Ultimately, this will enable an over-the-mountain 
connection from the JOA to the IIFC.   
 
3.3.4.3 802.16 (5.8 GHz) Maritime Point to Multi-
point. 
In order to test the functionality of a wireless 
point to multi-point link to connect two coalition operated 
security boats, a separate suite of 802.16 OFDM suites will 
be utilized (on a different frequency than the backbone 
point-to-point links). The MCP will operate an omni-point 
antenna linking to two separate omni antennas linked to the 
planned small boat FLAK. 
  
3.3.4.4 Integrated Crossbow Sensors. 
Via an integrated sensor network supplied by Crossbow 
Systems, Inc, the remote detection portion of the network 
topology will be tested. The Crossbow family of 
transceivers utilizes the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol standard 
for low data rate sensor networks.  The network consists of 
full function and reduced function nodes operating in the 
433 MHz, 915 MHz range and 2.4 GHz range.  The 2.4 GHz 
range operates over sixteen channels and uses offset 
quadrature phase shift keying modulation.  The 915 MHz band 
operates over ten channels and uses binary phase shift 
keying modulation.  Both ranges use Carrier Sense Multiple 
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Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA).  The nodes can 
be configured to carry a variety of sensors.  The most 
commonly used is the MTS 310 sensor board which offers an 
acceleration sensor, magnetic sensor, acoustic sensor, 
temperature sensor and light sensors.   
 
The Crossbow sensor network provides the capability for 
self-forming/self-healing sensor grids which are easily 
deployed.  These advantages, combined with small form 
factor and flexible configuration give today’s warfighters 
a substantial advantage.  The creation of integrated 
sensor/camera networks has applicability in perimeter 
defense, vehicle security, choke point control and border 
monitoring.  Having the ability to remotely monitor an Area 
of Interest lessens the burden on the warfighter, allowing 
for better tactical deployment of human assets. While 
limited land-based testing of an integrated sensor/camera 
network has occurred, no current evaluation regarding the 
performance of this technology in operational environments 
or littoral waters have been conducted.  However, deploying 
the sensors along a beachhead, the banks of a river, or 
along piers is well within their current capabilities.  The 
goal is to provide a low cost yet effective sensor mesh to 
improve Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance in support of Tactical Coalition Networking 
Environments. 
 
3.3.4.5 Wearable Computing.  
NPS and RTARF personnel shall be equipped with 
wearable networked computing devices supplied by Mercury 
Data Systems (MDS).  These devices will serve as nodes on 
the network and personnel will deploy to the surrounding 
areas at the Mae Ngat Dam to ascertain vegetation effects 
on signal performance. 802.11g handheld computers will also 
be utilized to measure COTS capabilities concerning this 
equipment.  
 
3.3.4.6 Thai UAV. 
The RTA or RTAF may potentially supply a UAV, 
pilot, and associated C2 platforms to support the COASTS 
project.  The Thai UAV, with a maximum range of 200km, will 
operate at the Mae Ngat Dam and will be equipped with a 
camera and an 802.11g network connection.  The Thai UAV may 
also provide a live video feed to the MCP and the IIFC.   
 
 146
3.3.4.7 Thai AU-23 Aviation 802.11g Link. 
The RTAF will supply an AU-23 fixed wing aircraft 
and pilot. The AU-23 will operate in the JOA and will be 
equipped with payloads consisting of various video and 
wireless networking.  The AU-23 will provide an opportunity 
to test these payloads under varying conditions and 
altitudes and also to serve as a back-up aerial node in the 
COASTS network topology.   
 
3.3.4.8 Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) Agents.   
These are the nodes and software associated with 
unmanned sensors such as seismic monitors, sound sensors, 
and streaming ground or balloon originating video feeds 
(some with GPS enabled systems).  MDS will cooperate with 
various NPS students, enabling the development of a common 
information environment through the use of SSA software 
entitled “C3Trak.” 
 
3.3.4.9 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) / Network 
Operations Center (NOC)  
The TOC and NOC will collect and display the data 
feeds from the various network nodes.  This is the C2 
center where the deployed technology data feeds are fused 
and the force multiplying effects of the technology is 
leveraged. The MCP shall function as a TOC and NOC 
respectively.   
 
3.3.4.10 SATCOM Link. 
The RTAF is investigating the feasibility of a 
SATCOM link between the MCP and the IIFC/Wing 41 to provide 
for an entirely wireless, large coverage area network, as 
well as a secondary communications link for the real-time 
information display to RTAF HQ, the Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center (MIFC), and NPS.   
 
3.3.4.11 Network Defense.  
A survey of the network from a defensive aspect, 
using open source and COTS products, may be conducted on a 
not-to-interfere basis. The 2006 COASTS deployment will 
also utilize a Network Security Detachment, who will 
establish Computer Network Defense (CND) applications to 
counter simulated adversary actions, conducted by the Joint 
Information Operations Center (JIOC) Red Team.  
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3.3.4.12 Modeling and Simulation.  
Using modeling and simulation techniques, 
empirical results from the demonstration may be compared to 
predicted results in order to refine modeling capabilities 
and better predict the data from network testing. The 
Operations Research department at NPS has conducted war-
gaming efforts based on the COASTS interdiction scenario 
involving realistic small-scale conflicts with UWSA forces 
attempting to smuggle yaa baa products across the Thai-
Burmese border.  
 
3.3.4.13 Micro/Mini UAVs.   
Both the RTARF and U.S. military forces are 
interested in tactical application of UAVs, specifically 
with respect to the implementation and operational use of 
micro- and mini-UAVs.  These extremely small form factor 
UAVs, using swarming technologies or other processes, can 
augment and/or potentially replace the larger, traditional 
UAVs and manned aircraft. One fixed-wing mini-UAV, one 
rotor-powered mini-UAV, and one shifting multi-environment 
micro-UAV will be integrated into the COASTS network.  
 
3.3.4.14 High-Altitude LTA Platforms.   
Again, both the RTARF and U.S. military forces 
are pursuing the application of high-altitude, steerable, 
non-tethered airships.  The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) and Thai 
Department of Research and Development Office (DRDO) has 
already begun experimentation in this technology area and 
is seeking to partner with NPS to provide better, more 
capable, solutions. The RTN and DRDO will contribute a LTAV 
to the COASTS 2006 network and NPS will supply four 802.11g 
network extending balloons to establish aerial 
communications. 
 
3.3.4.15 Maritime Missions.   
The Thai DRDO has previously conducted ship-to-
shore wireless network experiments in the Gulf of Thailand 
and is seeking to link information collected from seaborne 
sensors with a surface search radar system deployed to the 
Thai Naval Station at Sattahip.  Ultimately the COASTS 2006 
effort will contribute to the Thai objectives as maritime 
data will be collected, fused, and disseminated to 
appropriate C2 centers.  
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In addition, Lawrence Livermore National Labs 
(LLNL), the NPS, and the MDP-RG are all conducting various 
field experimentation as part of the Virtual Test Bed 
concept, which when augmented by the COASTS 2006 
demonstration, will showcase the functionality of a fused 
intelligence-sharing capability for countering asymmetric 
threats in the maritime environment.  
 
3.3.5 COASTS Critical Event Schedule.   
The table below depicts a high level schedule of critical 
events for the COASTS project - included are the critical 




4-7 October Concept Development Conference 
(Monterey) 
20-30 November Site Survey (Chang Mai, Thailand) 
5-9 December Integrated Network Test I (Pt Sur, 
California) 
2006  
1-12 January  Mini-tests (Monterey, California) 
12-16 January  Baseline Node Tests (Fort Ord, 
California) 
23-27 January  Mid-Planning Conference (Thailand) 
6-10 February  Integrated Network Test II (Pt Sur, 
California) 
20-24 February  Final Planning Conference (Thailand) 
20-31 March  COASTS Network Set-up Deployment 
(Thailand) 
22-31 May COASTS Demonstration Deployment 
(Thailand) 
TBD June COASTS After Action Review 
(Thailand) 
  
Figure 16.      Critical Events Schedule. 
 
3.4 CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES (COIS)  
• The COASTS project demonstration in Thailand has 
four primary overarching COIs:  
• Does COASTS provide threat warning 
information as part of a wireless LAN/WAN? 
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• Does COASTS meet performance requirements 
when deployed to Thailand 
(ground/jungle/maritime scenario)? 
• Does COASTS enable a last mile data 
connection for regional and global fusion 
centers? 
• Can the COASTS network be utilized to enable 
coalition law enforcement and military 
operations in a hazardous tactical 
environment?  
The COASTS Oversight Group will refine and finalize the 
supporting Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of 
Performance (MOPs), linked to specific operational tasks, 
standards and conditions, based on the OPORDS for each 
specific demonstration.  The assessment strategy and the 
final assessment criteria will be clearly delineated in the 
appendix of the final demonstration OPORD. 
 
3.5 MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) AND MEASURES OF 
PERFORMANCE (MOP). 
In order to make logical decisions and choices in network 
development, criteria to measure the value or relative 
importance of aspects of the network is required.  This is 
an essential pre-requisite for system analysis and 
predictive study.  Both the client (customer, user) and 
network designer have such measures, and these measures are 
related.  
 
MOE represent the user view, usually annotated and of 
qualitative nature. They describe the customers’ 
expectations of functional performance and should be viewed 
as the voice of the user. 
 
MOP are the corresponding view of the designer; a technical 
specification for a product. Typically MOP are quantitative 
and consist of a range of values about a desired point. 
These values are what a designer targets when designing the 
network, by changing components, protocols and 
infrastructure locations, so as to finally achieve the 
qualities desired by the user. 
 
Both the MOE and the MOP can be constructed as a hierarchy 
diagram. Each horizontal level of the hierarch represents 
100% of the effectiveness or performance. 
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COASTS MOE and MOP were evaluated by the Data Collections 
team to most efficiently gather and analyze the data 
associated with each measure.  In the following hierarchy 
diagrams, each node is identified and MOE and MOP are 
listed in an attempt to specifically communicate each 
node’s data collection needs.   
 


















IX Chariot ®  / Field 
Measurement Environmental
IX Chariot ®  / Field 
Measurement Environmental
IX Chariot ®  / Field 
Measurement Environmental
IX Chariot ®  / Field 
Measurement Environmental  
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platforms to xx knots
Mobile and based 
platforms In dense 
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 video and data0.25 Real-time 0.251.0
Easily configurable0.1
Max one day to 














IX Chariot ®  
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platforms to xx knots
Mobile and based 
platforms
In dense vegetation
No break in service when 
traversing AOR
Real-time
Max one day to 























Of each balloon 
node w/
In X minutes
Effective assembly and 




Time w/ in mesh
Balloon Node 
MOP’s





Support live video feeds 
To other nodes in
802.11 network
With ground nodes
Assembly of balloon 
Payload and attachment
To the balloon in X min
Launch and recover




(zoom, pan, tilt, focus)
With other air platform 
nodes
Establish good signal 
Strength w/ in mesh
No break in service when 
traversing AOR
Measures of Performance Measurement Method
Field / Timer
Field / Timer
IX Chariot ® 




IX Chariot ® 













Log GPS-based mobile user coordinates. 
Log Inertial Navigation System-based 
mobile user coordinates. 
Identify mission personnel and store 
coordinates
Determine mobile user location via 
reception and processing of GPS signals 












Display current mission personnel 
coordinates on 2D/3D Map User Interface
Display prior mission personnel (track/










Identify mission personnel groups
and store coordinates0.25 0.0625
Display mission personnel list0.25 0.0625
Display mission personnel group list0.25 0.0625
Identify mission personnel groups
and store coordinates0.5
Denied GPS
Determine mobile user location via 
reception and processing of sensor 
outputs via a mobile Inertial Navigation 
System where GPS signals cannot be 
received or are inaccurate
0.25
0.5
Automatically switch between GPS mode 








3.5.5 C3 Trak MOE - 2 
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3.5.6 C3Trak MOP - 1 
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3.5.7 C3Trak MOP-2 
Measures of Performance
Record Total System Operating 
Time
Record Operational Mission 
Software Faults.
Infrastructure Record Total Elapsed Time to 
Correct Operational Mission 
Failures.
Record System Up Time.
Measurement Method
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® / C3 Track
Field Collected Data
IX Chariot ® 
Record System Down Time.  
Calculate MTBOMF*
Calculate Ao**
Mean-Time Between Operational 
Mission Failure  of (4) hours active 
operation or greater, with no loss of 
data.
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® 
Ao = 0.95**
Ao = 0.99**
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® 
Total System Operating Time* MTBOMF=



























IX Chariot ®  / Binary
Field Measurement 
Field Measurement / Binary
Easy to Configure0.125
20 Frames per second
Wireless Connectivity
IX Chariot ®  / Field 
Measurement / Binary
IX Chariot ®  
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3.5.9  Sensors MOE 
Detect objects in a marine environment
0.5
0.125
Detect objects over land
0.5
0.125






Detect boat and automobile traffic
0.333
0.1
Determine heading and velocity of object
0.333
0.1









Minimum battery life of 3 months
0.20
0.06
Operate under adverse climactic 
conditions0.20
0.06
Operate in various environments
0.20
0.06










Operate in Maritime and 
Land Environments0.25







3.5.10  Sensors MOP 
Measures of Performance
Number of False detections 
Number of missed detections 
Sensors
Range of detection in feet from 
sensor to target
Bandwidth used to communicate 
between nodes in Hz
Measurement Method
C3 Track / Field Measurement
C3 Track / Field Measurement
Field Measurement
Field Measurement
Data rate of transmission in bits per 
second
Time between sensing object and 
transmitting detection message in 
microseconds   
Link Quality  (Packets received/
packets sent)
Latency
IX Chariot ® 
Field Measurements
IX Chariot ® 
IX Chariot ® 
Time in minutes to deploy sensors
Ability to determine direction and 





4.0 MANAGEMENT STRATEGY. 
4.1 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS, ROLES, AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 
4.1.1 COASTS Oversight Group. 
The oversight committee will be chaired by the NPS Dean of 
Research. Membership includes the Director MDP-RG, COASTS 
Program Manager, the COASTS Operational Manager, the COASTS 
Air Marshall, and the COASTS Student Team and Network 
Leaders. 
 
4.1.2 COASTS Program Manager (PM).   
Lead element of the COASTS project; responsible for project 
execution, coordination between NPS, DoD, foreign partners, 
and commercial vendors; responsible for all fiduciary 
reports and contractual agreements.  The COASTS 2006 PM is 
Mr. James Ehlert (Information Sciences Department faculty 
member). 
 
4.1.3 COASTS Operational Manager (OM).   
The OM is responsible for developing all demonstrations, 
plans, collection and dissemination of data, site surveys, 
MOE, MOP, NPS resource allocation, internal NPS 
coordination, and support to the PM.  The OM plans, 
coordinates and directs all user activities related to the 
COASTS project.  The OM will develop and provide the 
CONOPS, TTPs, operational mission scenarios, and the 
overall utility assessment.  Additionally, the OM will 
coordinate administrative tasks for user participants, 
equipment and facilities supporting demonstration events.  
The COASTS 2006 OM is Mr. James Ehlert (Information 
Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.4 COASTS Technical Manager (TM).    
The TM is responsible for technical management including 
program management, engineering, and acquisition of 
technologies to integrate and demonstrate.  The TM will 
provide technical support to the OM and manage all funding 
and technology development efforts related to the COASTS 
project.  The TM has the overall responsibility for 
establishing criteria for technical performance 
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evaluations. The COASTS 2006 TM is Mr. James Ehlert 
(Information Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.5 COASTS Air Marshall.    
The COASTS Air Marshall is the authority on all aviation 
planning, management, and de-confliction. The Air Marshall 
will liaise with all contractors, Thailand aviation POCs, 
and all NPS aviation operators. All logistics requiring 
aviation assets will be managed and controlled by the Air 
Marshall. The COASTS 2006 Air Marshall is Mr. Ed Fisher 
(Information Sciences Department faculty member). 
 
4.1.6 Participating Test Organizations.    
The primary organization for assessment for the COASTS 
demonstration in Thailand is the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Other participating organizations are as follows: 
   
U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) 
Joint Inter-Agency Task Force West (JIATF-W) 
Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) 
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) 
Thai Department of Research & Development Office (DRDO) 
   
4.2 RISK ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION. 
Overall risk is estimated to be low to medium for the 
COASTS May 2006 Thailand demonstration.  Risks can be 
mitigated by either reducing or adding additional 
experiments as appropriate.  The table below depicts the 
NPS developed risk matrix: 
 
Risk Area Rating Mitigation Approaches 
Technology Low 
Medium 
- early/continuous coordination 
with partners  
- early prototyping 
- multiple data collection 
events 
- modeling and simulation 
- in-process reviews 




- schedule estimates based on 
technology provider agreements 
- schedule estimates COASTS 2005 
lessons learned 
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- incremental demonstrations 
- identify/leverage existing 
events 
Assessment Low - Individual researchers develop 
MoE and MoP for their components 
of the demonstration. 
Funding Low - significant funding confirmed, 
additional sponsors contacted 
Figure 17.   Risk Matrix 
 
4.3 DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY. 
The appendices of this document will provide specific 
guidance on each particular area, element, and component 
under study during the COASTS demonstration. 
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5.0 TRAINING, LOGISTIC AND SAFETY. 
5.1 TRAINING. 
A primary goal of the COASTS project is to execute 
operational demonstrations in conjunction with U.S. and 
Thailand forces/resources.  Accordingly, appropriate 
training materials will be developed for each demonstration 
and operator training will be conducted prior to each 
demonstration.  Training will be performed by a combination 
of contractor and government personnel.  There are also 
significant hands-on educational opportunities for NPS 
students, and it is expected that multiple NPS masters 




Maintenance and logistics support will be conducted using a 
combination of contractor support and in-house NPS 
expertise and facilities. This includes the development and 
distribution of maintenance, training, and operating 
manuals, instructions, or materials.  During the 
demonstrations reliability, availability, and 
maintainability information will be collected for later 
analysis and review.  
 
5.2.1 COASTS Set-Up and Demonstration. 
The COASTS team members will transit from Bangkok to 
Chiang Mai via civilian air transport.  All COASTS 
equipment will be transported from the Bangkok 
International Airport to the Wing 41 RTAF air base via a 
RTAF-supplied C-130 or ground transport vehicle.   The 
departure and return schedule are currently not determined 
but will be based upon operational and administrative 
requirements during each set-up or demonstration time 
period. NPS thesis students will handle the logistics, 
financial management of transportation, as well as 
necessary host nation support issues.  
5.2.2 COASTS Equipment Shipping and Storage. 
The NPS will provide JUSMAGTHAI (POC: Lt Col Mel 
Prell) and the American Embassy Bangkok (POC: LTC Mike 
Creed) with a list of equipment to be shipped in support of 
the March set-up and the May demonstration.  JUSMAGTHAI 
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will help with the arrival of the equipment and facilitate 
processing through Thai Customs to minimize delays.  
All COASTS equipment will be stored at either Wing 41 
or at JUSMAGTHAI.  The minimum requirements for either of 
these facilities will be controlled access (lock and key) 
to prevent the loss of equipment and air-conditioning to 
preserve the material condition of electronic devices.  
 
5.3 SAFETY. 
The potential exists for safety or environmental hazards 
associated with technologies being utilized.  As needed, a 
safety analysis will be performed to identify potential 
safety hazards and risks and determine appropriate controls 
to preclude mishaps and reduce risks.  This is especially 
true with regard to manned and unmanned flight operations.  
The OM will coordinate all safety efforts associated with 
demonstrations, with the assistance of the Air Marshall for 
flight operations (see next paragraph).  
 
Air-space management will be handed by the COASTS Air 
Marshall (Mr. Ed Fisher). Separation of the numerous 
aviation assets will ensure no collisions occur during 
field experiments in Point Sur and at the Mae Ngat Dam. An 
NPS student is designated as the COASTS 2006 Safety 
Officer, and will conduct all operations under the 
direction of U.S. Navy Safety Instructions.  An Operational 
Risk Management (ORM) Matrix will be developed and adhered 
to during all operations.  
 
6.0 MODIFICATIONS. 
This CONOP is intended to be a living document.  It will be 
updated as required to reflect changes to the COASTS 
project as it pertains to the Thailand demonstration.  Most 
modifications will be at the discretion of the COASTS 
Oversight Group who will approve any substantive 
alterations to include changes in objectives, funding, 
schedule, and scope.  Any changes which materially affect 
commitments made by Thailand will be approved by the 
affected organizations.  
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APPENDIX A-1. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
A.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.  The goal of the COASTS network is to build and 
demonstrate the flexibility, mobility, durability, and 
scalability of COTS 802.11 a/b/g and 802.16 wireless 
networks deployed to rugged and varied terrain under 
adverse climatic conditions.  These networks will be the 
infrastructure for transmitting state of the art sensor and 
ISR data providing improved tracking of littoral and ground 
movements, identifying which tracks are potential threats, 
prioritizing them for action, and providing engagement 
confirmation and battle damage assessment. 
2.  The COASTS network is designed to be robust, 
rapidly deployable, modular, and reconfigurable to meet all 
the needs of tactical, operational, theater, and strategic 
decision makers in coalition environments.  COTS 
technologies, in particular open standard/open source 
technologies, provide these capabilities due to their ease 
of configuration, small form factor, technological 
proliferation, and low cost separate from the DoD 
acquisition bureaucracy. 
 
B.  802.16 POINT TO POINT LONG HAUL COMMUNICATIONS SUITE 
1. The 802.16 point-to-point links will provide long-
haul connectivity between the scenario network at the Mae 
Ngat Dam and the IIFC in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  The 802.16 
technology was chosen for integration in the network due to 
its advantages over the alternative technologies for long-
haul communications, namely 802.11, commercial SATCOM 
(COMSATCOM), and terrestrial (802.3) infrastructure.  
Specific advantages of 802.16 include: 
a. Greater range than 802.11 technologies  
b. Higher data throughput rates than COMSATCOM 
c. No terrestrial infrastructure required 
d. Low cost alternative to COMSATCOM and terrestrial 
communications 
2. Product Information 
a. Redline Communications Pre-IEEE 802.16 
Compliant Products: 
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  i. AN-50e  
   - Point to point suite consisting of 
two base stations, two radio transceiver, and two parabolic 
flat panel antenna of various sizes.  
   - Provides high data throughput (up to 
54 Mbps) rates with very low latency or jitter at ranges of 
up to 30 KM.   
 
C.  802.16 POINT TO MULTI-POINT MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 
SUITE 
1. The 802.16 point to multi-point communications 
suite will provide mobile connectivity to maritime assets 
on the Mae Ngat Reservoir.  The 802.16 technology was 
chosen for integration in the network due its superiority 
over other wireless technologies for mobile and multipoint 
wireless networking.  Specific advantages include: 
 a. Client stations associate with only one master 
station.  Clients do not need to constantly re-associate 
with “in range” access points as is the case with 802.11 
coverage. 
 b. 802.16 communication protocol allows for high 
relative velocities between master and client stations; 
802.11 does not have this capability.  
 c. Greater range than 802.11 coverage.  
2. Product Information 
a. Redline Communications Pre-IEEE 802.16 
Compliant Products 
  i. ST-58E  
   - Man portable client station 802.16 
point to multi-point networks. 
   - Provides high data throughput rates 
(up to 54 Mbps) to mobile clients at speeds up to 150 Kts. 
  .ii. Point-to-Multipoint configured AN-50E 
   - Same technology as the PtP AN-50.  It 
includes a special firmware installation that enables 





D. 802.11 WIRELESS MESHED NETWORKS 
1. The Wi-Fi network provides connectivity for mobile 
clients both on the ground and in the air. Wrapped in a 
lighter package than other technologies, 802.11 provides 
the throughput required to utilize various commercial 
technologies such as VoIP, real-time video, as well as 
sensor to shooter and intelligence collection data. 
 2. The 802.11 mesh network technology was chosen for 
its advantages over alternate methods of wireless local 
area networking technology such as conventional 802.11, 
802.16, and analog radios.  In addition, the proliferation 
of 802.11 enabled clients makes the use of an 802.11 
network almost mandatory.  Specific advantages of 802.11 
mesh networks include the following: 
 a.   It is self-forming and self-healing unlike 
conventional 802.11.  
 b. It has higher throughput, lighter pack weight 
and lower power consumption than analog radios 
 c.   It has a smaller form factor than 802.16. 
3. Product Information 
a. Mesh Dynamics MD-300 Series  
 b. Specifications   
• 2.4GHz Structured MeshTM backhaul  
• Self-healing and self-forming  
• Session-persistent roaming  
• Integrated 802.11 b/g access  
• AES-CCMP encrypted backhaul  
• WPA (Personal and Enterprise) security  
• Multiple-SSIDs with 802.1q VLAN support  
• Independent Security profile per SSID  
• Remote Management and Monitoring  
• Power over Ethernet  
• NEMA rated outdoor enclosure  
 
E.  COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 
802.16 point-to-point and point-to-multipoint will be 
employed to provide long-haul data transmission link from 
the mesh-network to the IIFC.  Satellite transmission will 
provide connectivity between regional fusion centers 
located at Bangkok, Thailand and California, USA.  
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Commercial satellite connectivity will serve as an internet 
gateway to the World-Wide Web. 
 
F.  SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS APPLICATION 
1. C3Trak (see Figure 18 next page) serves as a mobile, 
distributed and networked personnel management system that 
delivers situational awareness capabilities in support of 
military and law enforcement operations.  C3Trak 
aggregates, processes and displays navigational, 
environmental, and asset management data, in near real-
time, to facilitate C2 decision-making, and the generation 
and publishing of plans and orders.  C3Trak is comprised of 
three tiers of applications connected through a high speed 
wireless local area mesh network, and a high speed wireless 
long-haul wide area network backbone.  Military/law 
enforcement utility of C3Trak involves surveillance and 
tracking and search and rescue mission areas, but C3Trak 
can be applied to a number of different mission areas where 
mobile ad-hoc networking is required. local commander the 
situational awareness needed to be able to act and react 








Figure 18.   C3Trak System Diagram 
 
2. The 1st tier establishes a peer-to-peer network of mobile 
handheld devices, linked to sensors that provide 
navigational inputs.  The 1st tier handheld clients can 
operate both in GPS enabled and GPS-denied environments, 
and can be configured to automatically switch between modes 
of operation.  In GPS-denied environments, sensor inputs to 
the mobile clients are provided by quadrature multiple 
frequency ranging (QMFR), RF Location Beacons, PNM, etc.  
Mobile handheld units possess full capabilities to 
communicate with other mobile clients on the meshed 
wireless local area network, including the 2nd tier base 
station unit.  Communications include full text messaging 
capabilities, forwarding of absolute and relative spatial 
positions (see Figure 19 next page), and asset management 
of resources, including mesh sensors and monitoring and 









     
  
           
 
 
           
             
   
            
   
  
  





Figure 19.   Position sensor integration 
 
3. The 2nd tier base station unit serves as the primary 
command and control node in the local area network.  It 
provides a near real time common operational picture as it 
correlates and fuses data from multiple sensors and 
intelligence sources to provide the local commander the 
situational awareness needed to be able to act and react 
decisively.  The base station unit acts as the intermediary 
between the mobile clients and the data warehousing and 
processing 3rd tier relational database management system.  
Similar to the handheld mobile clients, the base station 
unit possesses an extensive suite of integrated automation, 
messaging, and collaborative applications.  However, the 
base station unit incorporates additional aggregation and 
processing applications to facilitate the local area 
commander with mission planning and execution.  The 2nd tier 
feeds aggregated data, by way of a high speed wireless 
long-haul communications link, to the 3rd tier relational 
database. 
4. The 3rd tier applications incorporate the force 
monitoring applications required by the regional commanders 
to effectively assess military operations.  It is comprised 
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of a series of redundant relational database and web-host 
servers, designed to accommodate and process the large 
volumes of data sent from the local area meshed network 
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APPENDIX A-3.  NPS THESIS RESEARCH IN SUPPORT OF 
COASTS 2006 
LT Hochstedler Wireless Network Topologies ISO countering 
Asymmetric Threats in the Maritime 
Environment 
LT Powers Data Compression Applications in deployed 
Wireless Networking  
ENS Chesnut Applications of Integrated Sensors for 
Tactical operations 
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ENS Le Deny GPS in tactical wireless environments 
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LCDR Gawaran  
IT Costs of deploying Hastily Formed 
wireless networks into tactical theatres of 
operation 
ENS Diamond Use of wireless networks ISO fire-control 
data passage to Strike Operations 
ENS Russo Deployment of Lighter than air vehicles in 
tactical wireless network deployments 
ENS Hsu Deployment of micro-UAVs for support of ISR 
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Analysis of Logistical requirements for 
deploying wireless networks  
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Wireless Network Security in Tactical 
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ENS Schall Code applications in wireless sensor 
deployments 










































































































































APPENDIX A-4.  DATA COLLECTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1. Validation of hypotheses using collected data is an 
essential step in the process of research.  Be it test and 
evaluation, proof of concept, or theoretical modeling, the 
collection and analysis of data provide accepted 
mathematically rigorous means by which conclusions are 
drawn.  In the context of COASTS, data collection and 
analysis are a means to empower decision makers to draw 
conclusions based on data collected in the field for each 
phase of COASTS 2006. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Collection Points 
a. Environmental Data 
Based on past observation of network performance 
in Thailand, it is theorized that network performance is 
significantly affected by temperature.  To validate this 
hypothesis and potentially model the affects of temperature 
on network performance meteorological data will be 
collected in each phase of the COASTS project.  For the 
context of COASTS 2006, distance measurements and locations 
are also considered environmental data. 
 
b. Benchmarking Data 
MOE and MOP inputs primarily drive the need for 
benchmarking by identifying specific metrics of concern and 
providing thresholds of acceptable performance.  Specific 
metrics require a trend of performance across a specified 
range that can only be evaluated against preliminary, or 
benchmark data.  Still other metrics require specific 
performance thresholds at all levels of effective use.   
Data collected before the Thailand phase of 
operations provides a pool of data collected in known 
conditions to compare to data collected in the operational 
phase.  Also, initial conclusions and potential areas of 
interest may be generated through the analysis of this 
initial data.  The data also provides a means to analyze 
the performance of sensor systems and network hardware 
against the claims of the manufacturers. 
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Examples of benchmarking are the observed rate of 
detection at given distances for a specific sensor or the 
observed signal strength generated from a specific antenna 
at given distances. 
 
c. Network Data 
Performance of computing networks is potentially 
affected by a wide and varied array of inputs and 
atmospheric conditions.  Signal strength, latency, 
throughput, packet loss, and jitter are just a few of the 
performance measures associated with network performance.  
Each of these and additional measures will be collected 
throughout the project using a commercial application that 
collects and stores data network specific data.  A time 
stamp is associated with each data point to match network 
data with data collected apart from the network. 
d. User Data 
Subjective data such as ease of use and usability 
of displayed information will be developed as categorical 
data.  This will enable regressive techniques to be used 
from which the team can draw more useful conclusions. 
 
e. Data Collection Operations 
To the maximum extent possible, data collection 
will be conducted in a manner that minimizes error.  When 
possible gauge error will be estimated from manufacturer 
specification and input into the statistical model.  Data 
collection methods will be utilized that minimize the 
impact on the observed values. 
 
f. Data Preparation / Model Formulation 
Once data has been collected, a permanent copy of 
all raw data will be kept in a central location by the Data 
Collection node leader.  Data normalization and 
manipulation will only be carried out with copies of the 
raw data collected. 
Statistical models will, to the maximum extent 
possible, minimize variability while maintaining accuracy 
and tractability.  Construction of statistical models will 
be documented in such a manner as to assure reconstruction 
of the model solely from the documentation. 
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g. Analysis and Conclusions 
Only after statistical models have been 
constructed and validated in accordance with paragraph f. 
above will any inference from analysis be undertaken. 
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APPENDIX A-5.  MINI-UAVS 
A.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Mini-UAVs will be used in the COASTS scenario to provide 
tactically persistent surveillance/reconnaissance.  In the 
2006 Thailand field experiment, presence of potential bad 
actors will be noted by sensor-“triggers”, and mini-UAVs 
will be launched to gain additional information on these 
bad actors and pass the information to local-tactical, 
regional-operational, and strategic C2 centers for 
continued consideration.  
 





The CyberBug is a small, lightweight, scaleable, low-cost 
mini-UAV.  One man may unpack, assemble, and launch the 
CyberBug in under one minute. It is hand-launched and 
capable of utilizing an auto-land system.  It may be 
programmed for autonomous operation with manual override 
available.  It is normally equipped with a stabilized 
gimbaled low light high resolution camera, and an IR camera 
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payload is available. It is electrically powered, and has 
about 45 minutes endurance.   
 
• Length 25-56 inches  
• Wing span 30 inches to 60 inches  
• Weight ~ 2.6 pounds scalable to 5 pounds  
• 45 minutes to 3.5 hours approximate flight time  
• 5-20 MPH  
• Autopilot / GPS navigation  
• Hand held viewer and joy-stick  
• Small 12x camera w/Optional cameras for day and 
IR(Indigo)  
• 9 -18 Volt battery  
• Carrying case (small unit)  
• EO/IR payload is scalable up to several pounds  
• Includes short range data link (long range is option)  
 
 





The Rotomotion SR-100 is a relatively small vertical take-
off and landing UAV.  It may be programmed for autonomous 
operation or can be flown manually. It has an auto-land and 
auto-takeoff capability. It may be equipped with either a 
day camera or an IR camera, and utilized a low-jitter 
capability to stabilize the video feed. It may be gasoline, 
diesel, or electrically powered.  If equipped with the 
electrical motor (COASTS preference for low-observable 
operations), it has about 60 minutes endurance.  
 
• 802.11-based Telemetry System 
• Length:2250 mm, 89” 
• Main Rotor (M/R) Dia.:1900 mm, 75” 
• Dry Weight:16 kg, 35lbs. 
• Fuel Cap:2 liter, 67 oz. ,(alcohol,diesel,50:1, 2cycle 
gasoline)up to 14 liter, 470 oz., tanks available 
• Engine :2-Stroke gasoline, alcohol, diesel conversion, 
or electric 
• Generator (optional):150W, 12V power bus with battery 
backup 
• Climb rate:122 mpm, 400fpm (AFCS regulated) 
• Speed:10 mps, 65 fps (AFCS regulated) 
• Endurance:30 min to 2 hours (depending on fuel tank 
configuration) 
• Max Payload: up to 7 kg, 20 lbs (depending on options, 
altitude, fuel load)  
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APPENDIX A-6.  COASTS 2006 STORYLINE 
The arrival of a longboat suspected of involvement in drug 
and arms smuggling operations will be detected by various 
unattended sensor suites deployed at a tactical waterborne 
choke-point(s).  When triggered by the motion of the 
longboat, the sensors will send an automatic system alert 
through the C3Trak SSA application.  This system alert will 
be observed by all the tactical forces connected to the 
network (refer to Figure 2), by the local C2 center (the 
IIFC in Chiang Mai), by the remote C2 center in Bangkok 
(RTAF HQ) and finally by the strategic C2 center in 
Alameda, CA (at the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center (MIFC)). The coalition small boat unit will 
also receive the alert via the 802.16 OFDM mesh network. 
Coalition small boats, camouflaged as local river 
merchants, will track the longboat, passing intelligence 
via Voice-over-IP (VoIP) communications and imagery back 
via mounted IP cameras over a wireless link.  
 
The system alert will enable coalition operators to track 
the movement of the longboat through various sensors 
deployed along the waterway.  At a pre-determined trigger 
point, the tactical C2 center will order the launch of the 
mini-UAVs and the full-sized UAV to establish tactical 
persistent surveillance. The UAVs will pass video (electro-
optical and infrared) through a wireless network 
established by four tethered aerial balloons, operating at 
altitudes up to 3500 feet, and each equipped with a 
wireless access point, and one non-tethered unmanned 
lighter-than-air vehicle (LAV) operating at altitudes of up 
to 10,000 feet.  The data obtained from the UAVs will be 
collected, fused, and disseminated by the C3Trak 
application to the on-scene commanders in the Mobile 
Command Platform (MCP). 
 
When the longboat arrives at a “drop-point” (near the end 
of the reservoir, close by the Mae Ngat Dam Boat Shop) the 
drug and explosive shipment will be transferred into the 
cargo bed of two awaiting trucks and an unidentified bad 
actor (man) is given a CD (contents include the details of 
the smuggling operation to include financial ties with 
terrorist organizations). This entire process is being 
remotely monitored (UAVs and balloons) and displayed at the 
local, regional, and strategic C2 centers. After the 
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transfer is complete, the longboat departs along the 
reverse route. A bad actor convoy (two trucks) is tracked 
as it moves along the road atop the Mae Ngat Dam while the 
individual bad actor will leave on foot on a northward 
path.  
 
The scenario will then split into two parts to research, 
test, and display the versatility and multi-tasking 
potential of the COASTS network. One part will entail the 
bad actor being tracked on foot by a Royal Thai Army and 
Police squad.  The bad actor will cross land-based sensor 
suites, again initiating a C3Trak system-wide alert. The 
IIFC will order the interdiction squad (equipped with a 
wearable computing device which can send/receive all 
network data, and biometric and explosive residue 
collection capabilities) to coordinate the apprehension of 
the suspected bad actor.   
 
The second part of the scenario will entail the convoy 
being tracked by the network sensors simultaneously. The 
vehicle carrying the larger portion of the drugs will also 
cross a Guardian sensor grid, deployed alongside the road, 
sending another C3Trak system-wide alert.  At this point, 
orders will be passed from the strategic command and 
control center (MIFC), via the operational node in Bangkok 
(RTAF HQ), to capture all monitored units: longboat, 
trucks, and bad actor. The bad actor will be captured 
without incident, but both the longboat and trucks are 
armed and put up heavy resistance against capture. Both the 
coalition small boat team and the vehicle interception team 
pass SITREPS via the COASTS network requesting tactical air 
support (L-39 jets). 
 
After apprehension of the bad actor is affected, biometric 
data will be gathered and passed to the MIFC for identity 
verification.  Once positive confirmation is received that 
the captive is the high value target in question, the 
coalition ground forces holding the bad actor will pass 
initial intelligence from the CD (captured with the bad 
actor’s personal effects) and initial custody status via 
C3Trak to all network users as well as the IIFC and MIFC. 
 
The COASTS Watch Officer (CWO) at the IIFC will request an 
air strike against the convoy from RTAF HQ.  As part of 
this request the CWO will pass GPS positions and other 
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targeting information.  The RTAF HQ directs two L-39s from 
Wing 41 to conduct the air-to-surface strike.   
 
Concurrently, coalition maritime interdiction teams will 
apprehend the long boat.  After apprehension of the bad 
actors, biometric data will be gathered and passed to the 
MIFC for identity verification. Once directed to maintain 
custody of the bad actors, the coalition maritime 
interdiction team will pass mission status via C3Trak to 
all network users as well as the IIFC and MIFC. 
 
The L-39’s loiter pending resolution of the maritime 
interdiction.  The scenario will finish after the maritime 
interdiction is completed and the L-39’s have departed the 
JOA.   
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APPENDIX B. TETHERED BALLOON SET-UP  
Table of Contents 
 
I. Balloon Platform Assembly 
II. Balloon Inflation and Deflation  
III. Winch Set-up and Operation 
 
I.  BALLOON PLATFORM ASSEMBLY 
 
A.  Equipment 
• 2’ x  4’ x  ½” piece of plywood (this serves 
as the centerpiece of the platform) 
• Seven (7) 2” x 4” x 4’ wood beams  
• Twenty (20) 2-1/2” Wood Screws 
• One (1) 3/4” Pad Eye Screw 
B. Assembly 
• Take three 2’x4’s and lay them parallel to 
each other.  The two outside 2’x4’s should 
be 4’ apart and the middle board should be 
placed evenly between the two outer boards. 
• Place the ½” plywood in the center of the 
three base boards. Ensure that that the 
plywood center piece is 24” wide and 48” 
long. Center the plywood on the base boards 
so that approximately 12” (from each end of 
the center piece) of the base boards remain 
exposed. 
• Use the wood screws to secure the plywood to 
the three base boards.   
• Take two of the remaining 2”x4”x4’ wood 
boards and place them in the same direction 
as the center board across the exposed 
portions of the base boards.  Place them 
opposite of each other, perpendicular and 
aligned at the ends of the baseboards.   
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• Fasten these boards to the base boards with 
wood screws. 
• Take the remaining two 2”x4”x4’ wood boards 
and place them parallel to the center boards 
and the end boards, ensuring that they are 
touching the center board.   
• Attach these boards to the base boards with 
wood screws. 
• The Pad-eye screw should be placed on the 
outside of the platform and centered on the 
plywood piece. 
 
II. THE BALLOON 
The balloon purchased by the COASTS 2006 team was a 
10-foot, sphere-shaped, helium balloon from the commercial 
company BlimpWorks.  
 
 
Figure 1 COASTS 2006 Balloon 
 A. Balloon Station Set-up 
• Layout a 10’x20’ tarp on the ground 
• Lay the wooden platform on the ground on the 
middle edge of one side of the tarp 
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• Place the winch on the platform and screw it 
into the platform 
• Set up three anchor lines  
• One anchored to the pad-eye screw on the 
platform 
• One anchored approximately fifty feet away 
from the platform on each end (use trees, 
guard rails, fences, etc.) 
 
B. Balloon Inflation 
• Stand helium tank straight up and remove 
protective lid. 
• Screw the nozzle of the inflation hose into 
the valve of the helium tank. 




Figure 2  Balloon Laid Out Flat Before Inflation 
• Attach the winch line and anchor lines to 
the metal ring on the balloon with a 
carabineer. 
• Take a 10-foot piece of thick nylon rope and 
attach it to the loop on the top of the 
balloon (the side opposite of where the 
metal ring is) with a carabineer. 
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Figure 3  Thick Nylon Rope Attached to Top of Balloon 
• Open the large opening on the bottom of the 
balloon by removing the plug. 
• Insert about two feet of the inflation hose 
into the opening  
 
Figure 4 Inserting Inflation Hose into Balloon 
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• Open the helium tank slowly and start 
inflating the balloon (Note:  Inflating the 
balloon too quickly may cause damage to the 
balloon). 
• As the balloon lifts off the ground make 
sure that someone is holding onto the area 
where the inflation hose is inserted into 
the balloon (Note: Do not pull the balloon 
down when holding it here because it will 
rip the seams of the balloon) 
• Be sure that the balloon is not filled 
completely to the point that it is very 
firm. 
• When the balloon is done inflating, remove 
the inflation hose and close the inflation 
valve at the bottom 
C. Balloon Deflation 
• Open the valve on the bottom of the balloon 
• Take the piece of nylon rope that is 
attached to the top of the balloon and tie 
it to the pad-eye screw on the platform 
• Keep the winch line attached to the metal 
ring and let enough of the winch line out so 
that the open valve is pointing directly up 
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Figure 5 Balloon Being Deflated 
• As the balloon sinks down to the ground, 
begin laying it flat across the tarp 
 
Figure 6 Lying Balloon on Tarp During Deflation 
• Once the balloon in empty and laid flat 
across the tarp, fold in each side of the 
balloon towards the center 
 197
 
Figure 7  Folded Up Balloon After Deflation 
• Start at the top of the balloon and roll it 
tightly towards the inflation valve so that 
all of the remaining helium is forced out of 
the balloon. 
 
III. WINCH SET-UP AND OPERATION 
 The winch used for the COASTS 2006 testing iterations 
was manufactured by the commercial company MY-TE Winches.  
The winch is rated to pull loads up to 1500 pounds. 
 
Figure 8 MY-TE Winch with Battery Hooked Up 
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 The equipment needed to operate the winch includes: 
• One 12 VDC Car Battery 
• One set of car battery jumper cables 
• 1000lb Test Spectra Line 
 
 A. Winch Operation 
• The balloon comes equipped with a switch 
that allows the user to reel the line in or 
let the line out 
• The manual clutch is the locking mechanism 
for the winch.  
 
1. Deploying the Balloon 
• To deploy the balloon, connect the 
battery cable to the battery and the 
winch and operate the switch in the 
desired direction. 
• To deploy the balloon manually, the 
manual brake must be released. To 
release the brake, the operator slowly 
pulls the brake handle in a downward 
motion (toward the operator) to release 
the safety latch, then slide the 
operator away from the drum. 
 
2. Retrieving the Balloon 
• Press the “IN” button on the switch 
panel 
• Using a carabineer, guide the line onto 
the spool so it will wind evenly onto 
the spool. 
• Once the balloon is at the desired 
height, discontinue pressing the “IN” 
button. 
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